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Total compensation is divided into current and deferred elements. Deferred portions are 
mainly composed of pensions and health benefits to which an employee is entitled upon retirement. 
Early pensions were designed to provide income security through a stream of payments, guaranteed 
by the employer, from when an individual ceased work until death. Beginning in the 1970s, other 
nations and U.S. private employers moved away from these defined benefit plans to individualized 
accounts, shifting income burdens and risks onto the employee, most public pensions retained the 
original structure. This is especially true for teacher plans. However, between 2000 and 2017, twelve 
states structurally reformed their plans. To understand why these states ratified reforms, I employ 
event history analysis in a unified model to identify the internal and external determinants that 
predict the probability of change. Constructing a dataset from a myriad of state and national sources, 
I examine the political, economic, and social factors that influence teacher pension policy diffusion 
across the legislative process, from introduction through final signing. I find that political factors, 
economic forces, plan attributes, and external mechanisms all influence a state’s decision to pursue 
and enact pension reform, although in different ways through the various stages of the process. In 
the current economic climate, with states and public pension plans facing ballooning deficits, and 
the focus on teacher quality and compensation, understanding these predictors provides researchers 
and policy-makers with a better understanding of when, how, and why the deferred aspect of teacher 
compensation may change. This understanding can help design complete compensation structures 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
Compensation systems are designed to attract and retain workers to a firm or organization. 
Lazear (1986) divided compensation into current and deferred components. Current earnings consist 
primarily of direct salaries, bonuses, and current benefits; deferred compensation consists mainly of 
retiree pension payments and health coverage (Koedel & Podgursky, 2016). Contract wage theory 
proposes that workers sacrifice current wages in exchange for deferred wage pensions that will be 
lower if they depart prematurely (Ippolito, 2002). Deferred compensation can entice employees to 
work for lower current wages in exchange for income security upon retirement or favorable tax 
treatment for pension contributions increasing overall earnings and savings (Clark & Quinn, 2006; 
Graebner, 1980; Gustman et al., 1994; Mitchell & Hustead, 2001), requires employees to maintain 
their level of effort and quality until eligible to collect (Clark et al., 2003; Lazear, 1979, 1986), and 
transitions older individuals out of the workforce in a timely manner to make room for newer, and 
cheaper, employees (Graebner, 1980). Deferred compensation also affects employee satisfaction. 
Employees covered by a pension, regardless of structure, have lower turnover rates and discipline 
issues while experiencing higher job ratings and promotion rates (Allen et al., 1991; Ippolito, 2002). 
Theoretically, the total compensation package in a well-run organization would be structured 
to enhance overall firm performance; tradeoffs between salaries and benefits would be scrutinized. 
Salary structure would take account of market benchmarks and performance effects. Deferred 
compensation would be designed to enhance the effects of differential salary structures to attract 
and retain the most qualified employees (Podgursky, 2011).  
Contrary to a perceived rational planning process ascribed to this efficient and well-run 





attempt to balance competing demands and interests, which vary by domain, to enact policies and 
set budgets that provide goods and services to their constituents (Aldrich & Rohde, 2002; Bergstrom 
& Goodman, 1973; Buchanan, 1999; Mayhew, 1974; Wlezien, 2004). One major portion of the state 
budget is directed to education, of which 60 percent is earmarked for instructional pay and benefits 
for teachers (Podgursky & Springer, 2011). Within budgets, legislators and legislatures must further 
balance competing values of equity, adequacy, efficiency, and liberty. In education and budgeting, 
equity attempts to provide an “equality of educational opportunity” (Guthrie et al., 2007, p. 166) or 
level-the-compensation-field, both current and deferred, throughout the teacher labor market labor. 
Adequacy, using Houck’s (2015) definition based on sufficiency, considers the amount and 
distribution of funding, which must be sufficient to meet the stated goals of attracting and retaining 
highly qualified individuals into teaching and having them distributed to where they are needed. In a 
personal and longer term, funding must also ensure that those individuals will be able to retire with 
sufficient support, both social and financial, after a career in the classroom.  
Efficiency relates to the use of resources – either the range of outputs (meeting consumer 
demands) based on given inputs or minimizing resources to produce a required output (Guthrie et 
al., 2007). Efficiency requires meeting the demands of those individuals entering or established in 
the profession as well as the myriad of demands of the constituents or populace through the 
allocation of the limited resources available. Finally, liberty provides the freedom to choose, either 
for individuals through the removal of barriers to individual choice or for protection of choice 
opportunities for the greatest number through imposition of laws and policies. Liberty also identifies 
a sense of security (Deborah Stone, 2012). Therefore, through this policy process, teacher 
compensation arises not out of a semi-rational planning process, but emerges as an amalgam of 





legacies from earlier vintages of collective bargaining agreements, and other institutional and political 
factors, pulled in various directions by these competing values (Podgursky, 2011). 
Furthermore, as Schneider and Ingram (1990) state, “public policy almost always attempts to 
get people to do things they otherwise would not have done, or it enables them to do things they 
might not have done otherwise” (p. 510). Since the inclusion of retirement benefits as a part of state 
teacher compensation, their structure has been the promise of a lifelong income stream following 
sufficient years of service, a design known as a “defined benefit”. This structure is argued to provide 
the motivation to not only work for lower pay in what many argue is an underpaid and overworked 
profession (Hanushek & Rivkin, 2007; Taylor, 2008), but to also ensure employees stay productive 
to ensure continued employment (Allen et al., 1991; Graebner, 1980; Lazear, 1983, 1986). The mix 
of teachers’ current versus deferred income, provided through these lifetime benefit plans, was 
further, “rationalized by the contention that the public good was best served by the longevity of 
service that would be induced by these pension plans” (Podgursky, 2014, p. 10). However, studies 
have shown that over 50% of teachers will either exit the profession or move schools within the first 
five years (Abshere, 2016; Ingersoll, 2003). Current compensation systems, whether the design of 
pay and benefits or perceived long-term feasibility, do not appear to be efficiently enticing these 
professionals to remain. 
Competing demands and value tensions have resulted in significant impacts to current 
pension funding. In 2020, pension liabilities of the major public pension plans in the United States, 
which include all state teacher plans, stand at 4.83 trillion dollars; teacher pensions account for 55% 
of that total. In 2019, teacher pension funds fell short of their liabilities by an estimated $740 billion, 
a $350 billion increase in unfunded liabilities since 2012, forcing many states to consider cost-saving 
changes. Teacher pensions are currently 72.1% funded, down from 101.9% in 2001; this is following 





2008 financial crises were contributory, continual underfunding and politics provided the two largest 
impacts to this funding level decline (Moe & Anzia, 2013; Munnell et al., 2015). Increasing funding 
shortfalls mean that by keeping present structures, governments will have to raise contributions or 
reduce benefits in the future to cover the accrued liabilities. Public pensions are legally protected in 
almost all states, most through constitions with the remainder through statutes or common law 
(Munnell & Quinby, 2012; U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2007). Protections apply 
to current workers. Pension benefits, once accrued, are protected; public employers generally can 
only change new hires’ benefits (U.S. GAO, 2007, 2008). State protections, based on contract theory 
or property interest, prevent governments from diminishing existing or future pension promises to 
currently employed workers; however, these benefits can be increased (Monahan, 2010). These legal 
and constitutional provisions can impact generational equity within the teaching profession. 
Additionally, since 2001, the actives to annuitants (contributors to beneficiaries) ratio has 
fallen from 2.43 to 1.35. This means that as debt has risen, the pay base has shrunk, raising costs for 
employees and employers and further stressing the system and requiring ever-increasing efficiency in 
the design and use of resources to provide for this growing segment of recipients (National 
Association of State Retirement Administrators (NASRA), 2020). Since the 2007-2008 Great 
Recession, nearly every state has attempted to address public pension plan shortfalls, seeking to 
balance multiple stakeholder goals. Reforms have tried to provide employees with competitive total 
compensation by offering income security in retirement, tried to give employers a human resource 
management tool to aid in recruitment and retention, and sought to furnish taxpayers with public 
services delivered in a cost-efficient manner (Brainard & Brown, 2018). Most reforms adjusted 
benefits (mainly for new employees), contribution rates, vesting periods, or cost-of-living 
adjustments, to improve their funding shortfalls (Brainard & Brown, 2018). However, a small few 





In the United States, the passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 
in 1974 precipitated a move by private industry away from the defined benefit structure towards a 
defined contribution plan. ERISA provided a comprehensive package of federal minimum standards 
for employer-provided pension plans. While not mandating employer pensions, the new statutes 
dictated that those companies that did provide pensions must meet requirements concerning 
information disclosure about plan features and funding, fiduciary standards for asset investments, 
minimum standards for participation, and vesting and funding standards. These requirements did 
not apply to public pensions; this led to a divergence in plan structure between public and private 
entities. (Hansen, 2010). Privatization of pensions accelerated after the implementation of the 1978 
Revenue Act, which allowed employees to make voluntary contributions to employer-sponsored 
retirement plans with pretax dollars (Butrica et al., 2009). In the U.S. in 1980, 38 percent of private-
sector workers had access to a defined benefit (DB) plan, by 2019, this had decreased to 16 percent, 
although 66 percent of unionized workers maintained DB plan access. Meanwhile, the number of 
private industry employees participating in a defined contribution (DC) plan rose from 8 percent in 
1980 to over 47 percent in 2019, and over 64 percent were at least offered a DC option. 
The movement towards pension reform and denationalization was paralleled in the global 
arena, which has seen a marked shift towards pension privatization in the past 40 years (Brooks, 
2005; Hennessy & Steinwand, 2014; Holzmann, 2013; Orenstein, 2011, 2013; O. Schneider, 2009). 
“From 1981 to 2007, over thirty countries worldwide fully or partially replaced their pre-existing 
pay-as-you-go pension systems with ones based on individual, private savings accounts” (Orenstein, 
2011, p. 65). Instigated by a transnational advocacy campaign touting the Chilean government’s 
“successful” structural pension system reforms, the World Bank’s 1994 release of Averting the Old Age 
Crisis, and the integration of the European Union with the inclusion of newer Central and Eastern 





fiscal unsustainability and projected demographic aging while accelerating financial market 
development (Brooks, 2007; Hennessy & Steinwand, 2014; Holzmann, 2013; Orenstein, 2011).  
Interest in reforming U. S. public pension plans, whether through shoring up growing 
funding shortfalls or redesigning the current structures, is significant, particularly following the fiscal 
stress in the wake of the 2008 recession. Concerns driven by high current-plan costs and changes in 
the labor market, where a 30-year, single employer career is no longer the norm, have sparked calls 
for change (Monahan, 2010). Yet, many public pensions maintain their traditional structure with 
legislatures continuing to underfund plans and direct current funding to other programs or demands. 
In contrast to U.S. private workers, in 2019, 86 percent of public workers had access to a DB plan, a 
mere 4 percent decrease from 1990, with 37 percent offered a DC option, up from 9 percent; and in 
2019, 99 percent of public school teachers still had access to a DB plan (Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS), 2020). However, a small, but growing, number of states structurally changed their plans, from 
the traditional defined benefit structure to defined contribution or hybrid options, shifting control, 
and risk, from employers to employees. The timeline of those states enacting structural change, 
through 2017, is shown in Figure 1. An explanation of the various design structures follows. 
Figure 1. 
Timeline of State Teacher Structural Pension Structural Change (Year of Passage) 
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Pension Types and Definitions 
There are two primary types of pensions in today’s teacher labor market. The most common 
public plan is a defined benefit (DB) plan whereby an employer provides a specified payment to an 





combination. The other major type, prevalent in private industry, is a defined contribution (DC), 
where an individual retirement saving account is established for the employee into which employees 
and employers contribute specified amounts, typically a percentage of salary. Final benefits available 
to the employee depend on the amounts contributed and investment income, or returns, earned by 
the account over the years (Hansen, 2010). Furthermore, a plan may be “contributory” or not. A 
contributory plan is one where the employee pays into their own plan; in a non-contributory plan, 
the employer pays all the costs. Understanding the plans’ structures informs how they affect, or are 
affected by, political, educational system, and individual labor market decisions.  
Most early pension plans were defined benefits, whereby the employer, initially the state or 
society, bears the cost and risk of providing a fixed level of retirement income for the elderly. In DB 
plans, current wages are given up in exchange for the future promise, known as the liability, of a 
stream of income. Although pensions can act as tax-free savings and spread income or taxes evenly 
across a lifetime, Lazear (1986) suggested DB pensions acted as incentives for employees to remain 
with an employer and continue to work so as to not be let go; incentivization remains a common 
argument today. To incentivize, DB plans retain some compensation until the end of employment. 
As salary typically increases throughout one’s career, a DB pension incentivizes a worker to continue 
working to not be terminated but remain employed until achieving the specified conditions.  
Defined benefit plans also affect turnover. Allen et al. (1991) found that turnover for 
individuals in jobs covered by pensions is reduced; however, this was mainly due to self-selection of 
specific categories of individuals into jobs and by the capital losses associated with moving jobs. 
Finally, the pension can act as a severance pay scheme, making work beyond the point of eligibility 
less lucrative – an employee, who could retire, is effectively working for partial pay, by foregoing the 
immediate pension income, and foregoing time to pursue leisure activities, that is increased once 





which attempts to define at what point an employee will maximize current pension wealth and how 
this affects an employee’s decision between continued work and leisure. A majority of individual 
labor market response research to changes in pension plans employ this model. 
Annual retirement benefits in a DB plan are distributed based on one of three formulas: Flat-
benefit – specified amount for each YOS, Career-average – benefits based on career average pay and 
YOS, or Final-pay (final average salary (FAS)) – benefits based on the average salary of a specific 
number of years at a career’s end, when earnings are highest, multiplied by YOS (Hansen, 2010).  
State teacher DB plans use FAS to calculate the final benefit level. The amount a teacher receives 
upon retirement, after attaining the eligibility age, YOS, or combination is modeled as:  
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹 ∗ 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹 ∗ 𝑀𝑀                             (Eq. 1) 
where 𝑀𝑀 signifies a multiplication factor – the percent used to compute the final benefit, typically 
between 1.5 and 2.5%. Funds for final pensions are maintained by a governing body, responsible to 
ensure sufficient funds are available to meet the liabilities of the plan. In most educators’ pensions, 
to meet these liabilities, a percentage of employee salary is withheld, and the employer contributes an 
additional amount. In private pensions, the employee typically does not contribute (Hansen, 2010). 
Teacher DB plans are predominantly structured on a pay-as-you-go basis. In these systems, current 
contributions are used to pay pension liabilities; monies are not tied to an individual contributor to 
pay for the participant’s future pension liability (Mitchell, 2011). 
Two types of liabilities determine how much funding is needed to meet the employer’s DB 
contribution obligation, normal costs and supplemental costs. Normal costs are the contributions 
required to meet the obligations to pay the projected benefits for active participants for the current 
year. Normal costs theoretically meet pension liabilities, but typically do not match the total amount 
required due to changes in plans or benefits or inaccurate assumptions. Supplemental costs cover 





actuarial assumptions.  Plan sponsors (state governments) may or may not meet full normal and 
supplemental cost funding. When contributions are inadequate, or assumptions, such as mortality 
rates, turnover, or rate of return on investments, are overly optimistic, unfunded actuarial accrued 
liabilities (UAALs) accumulate. Required contributions must then cover normal and supplemental 
costs and pay down the UAALs, typically amortized over 30 years, while also providing funding for 
current beneficiaries (Hansen, 2010; Koedel & Podgursky, 2016). The funded ratio identifies the 
ratio of assets in a plan versus the total actuarial liabilities it has accrued. This notes how well a plan 
meets normal and supplemental costs to pay promised retirement benefits for current employees, 
past employees, and survivors of past employees receiving benefits. 
In contrast to DB plans, DC plans are tied directly to an individual; these plans resemble 
401(k) plans or annuities. Funds are deposited by employees and employers into individual accounts 
held in each worker’s name. The plan specifies a contribution formula (percent of salary, employer 
match) that determines how much is deposited into the employee’s account each year. Typically, the 
employee manages her plan, through a plan provider, and chooses the actual investment portfolio or 
savings vehicle in which to place the funds, depending on her level of risk aversion and possible 
advice from the plan provider. Upon retirement, the pension wealth and benefit payments depend 
on the cumulative value of the contributions and the investment returns from the accumulated 
funds. The employer bears no risk or responsibility for meeting future liabilities, these are borne by 
the employee. Currently, four states, Alaska, Florida, Ohio, and Utah offer teachers a DC-only 
primary plan (TRSSI, 2019). Workers in 401(k) plans are exposed to investment risk, leaving them 
vulnerable to fluctuations in the stock and bond markets. With individual plans, pension wealth is 
also impacted by decisions of whether to convert the individual account upon retirement, and the 
timing of the conversion. If retirees choose to convert their balances to an annuity, final payouts can 





Two other plan types are currently used in teacher pensions, hybrid and cash balance plans. 
The hybrid option, currently offered in eight states, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington (TRSSI, 2019), incorporates aspects of both DB 
and DC plans. The DB portion entails lower contributions and a lower retirement multiplier for a 
smaller guaranteed benefit, with additional benefits accrued in the DC portion. These take many 
forms, tax-sheltered annuities (403(b) plans), pension equity options, cash balance/annuity/money 
purchase arrangements, or deferred-retirement option plans (Kimball et al., 2005). They provide 
advantages of both options while spreading some risk between the employer and employee.  
In cash balance plans, offered only in Kansas, an employee has her own notional individual 
account, credited each year by employee and employer contributions. Assets in the account grow at 
a fixed rate of return, typically a risk-free rate. Higher or lower actual market returns do not affect 
the employee’s final account, so the risk remains borne by the employer, but rates of return and 
actual funding amounts are fixed so both the employer and employee know the final account 
amount. When the employee becomes eligible to retire, they are entitled to the cash balance of the 
account and can receive either a periodic annuity or the lump-sum balance (Costrell, 2019; Hansen, 
2010). For the analysis of structural pension plan changes, I identify any legislation directing a 
change from a defined benefit-only plan to any other primary option structure. I also use the term 
pension privatization to identify this change. Before presenting the framework for this research, I 
present the current landscape of the teacher pension plan environment. 
Current Status of Pension Plans 
According to data from the Federal Reserve, U.S. public pension fund assets grew 
exponentially, rising from negligible holdings in 1945 to almost $11 trillion in 2007. Average 
combined teacher and employer contributions to provide retirement benefits rose from 10% in 1945 





statistics, employee contributions in plans with social security have risen from a median of 5% of 
salary in 2001 to 6% in 2018 while employer contributions have risen from 6% to 13.7% over the 
same period. For plans not covered by social security, employee contributions have remained stable 
at 8% while employer contributions have risen from 10.3% to 20.0% of average salary (National 
Association of State Retirement Administrators (NASRA), 2020). Furthermore, from 2004 through 
2020, taxpayer contributions for teacher pensions rose from $574 per pupil to over $1,000 by 2015 
and nearly $1,500 by 2019 (Costrell & McGee, 2020). These figures do not include Social Security 
contributions, retiree health benefits, or contributions by the employees. They also mask a large 
variation. In states like Ohio, which privatized and reduced benefits, contributions remained stable, 
while in Pennsylvania and Connecticut, per-pupil contributions rose by over $2,000 (Costrell, 2015).  
From 2004 through 2014, employer contribution rates to teacher pensions rose from 12% to 
18% of teacher salary. During this same timeframe, private sector employer rates remained flat at 
approximately 10% (Podgursky, 2014). In 2000-2001, teacher salaries totaled nearly $304 billion and 
benefits (health and pensions) were $58 billion (19% of salaries); by 2015-2016, salaries had risen to 
$378 billion while benefits had climbed to nearly $137 billion (36%) – although this includes rising 
health care costs, the increase in pension liabilities played a large role (Burnette II, 2019). These 
statistics point to an inadequate, inefficient, and inequitable current system with costs outpacing 
inflation, the burden shifting to taxpayers and new teachers, and impacting long-term sustainability.  
Additionally, throughout many of the past 30 years, states have failed to adequately fund 
pension systems, even during periods of economic growth; this underfunding worsens during times 
of fiscal stress (Costrell, 2018; Splinter, 2017). In an analysis of public pension plans, Johnston 
(2020) stated, “government contributions would have to rise by an additional 24.1 percent of payroll 
(a more than doubling from its current contribution of 16.3 percent of payroll) to close the fiscal gap 





the Department of Commerce (BLS, 2020). Judges in several states have upheld states’ liability for 
funding and have annulled state plans to decrease benefits for current employees (Johnston, 2020; 
Munnell & Quinby, 2012). These constraints limit tools available to legislatures to address problems 
of sustainability, desires of constituencies, and demands of aspirants to the teaching profession. 
Through 2017, fourteen states chose to attempt to balance these competing goals, not by adjusting 
the status quo, but by making structural changes to current plans. However, little is known about 
how these changes diffused throughout the states, nor what factors, or mechanisms, contributed to 
these innovations or reforms. Understanding the forces that increase, or decrease, the probability of 
pension reform can lead to a better understanding of what the future of educator compensation and 
teacher pensions may hold. 
Diffusion Analysis in Pension Research 
Policy change scholars identify two mechanisms through which policy innovations occur: 
internal determinants and policy diffusion (F. S. Berry & Berry, 1990, 2017). Internal determinant 
models build on Mohr’s (1969) study on change within organizations. These models posit that the 
internal characteristics of jurisdictions (states) are the most important factors to explain the adoption 
of an innovation. Policy diffusion models, stemming from the work of Walker (1969) and Gray 
(1973), postulate that the policy choices of other adopters are the most influential in the probability 
of a state adopting a new policy. More recent work by Berry and Berry (1990), studying the diffusion 
of state lottery adoptions, identified the deficiencies in relying on either internal or diffusion models. 
Incorporating aspects of both internal and diffusion mechanisms, their unified model has been 
embraced by numerous modern policy researchers to study policy innovations across policies 
ranging from state lotteries (W. D. Berry & Baybeck, 2005; Mooney, 2001), anti-smoking policies 
(Shipan & Volden, 2008), criminal justice (Makse & Volden, 2011), health insurance (Volden, 2006); 





(Cohen-Vogel et al., Forthcoming; Cohen‐Vogel & Ingle, 2007; Curran, 2015; Doyle et al., 2010; 
McLendon et al., 2006; Mintrom, 2001; Mintrom & Vergari, 1998), financial policies (Meseguer, 
2005; Mooney, 2001; Tandberg & Lacy, 2014), pensions (Brooks, 2005, 2007; Holzmann, 2013; 
Orenstein, 2011; Weyland, 2005), to the use of diffusion analysis itself (Graham et al., 2013). 
Scholars have sought to identify the motivations that aid or retard innovation diffusion, from policy 
type or attributes (Makse & Volden, 2011; Mallinson, 2016; Nicholson-Crotty, 2009) to diffusion 
mechanisms (F. S. Berry & Berry, 2017; Nicholson-Crotty & Carley, 2016; Shipan & Volden, 2008; 
Sugiyama, 2012). Approaches and applications continue to evolve (Braun & Gilardi, 2006; Gilardi, 
2016; Karch, 2007; Maggetti & Gilardi, 2016; Shipan & Volden, 2012; Diane Stone, 1999).   
Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett (2006, p. 787) define diffusion in policy research as, “when 
government policy decisions in a given [jurisdiction] are systematically conditioned by prior policy 
choices made in other [jurisdictions]” (cited in Gilardi, 2016, p. 9). This description identifies the 
interdependence of political entities and the forces involved in the spread of an innovation rather 
than specific outcomes, such as the eventual pension structure, a state ultimately adopts. Innovations 
and diffusion of some policy areas are more rapid than in others (Boushey, 2010; Mallinson, 2016; 
Nicholson-Crotty, 2009).  
Most policy adoptions follow a predetermined pattern, slow initial adoption followed by an 
increase in innovations with an eventual tapering off. Initially, few jurisdictions adopt the change. 
Gradually, diffusion gathers momentum as more and more governments learn from, emulate, or 
compete with previous adopters. Eventually, reform loses steam because it hits an insurmountable 
obstacle or has been widely or completely adopted (Weyland, 2005). The slow start, rapid rise, then 
taper off presents an S-shaped curve, which was notable at the turn of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries in national and state adoption of social insurance programs, notably in pensions 





several years or decades (Mallinson, 2016). However, most reforms follow this path. Noting the 
trajectory of the shift to privatized options visible in state teacher pensions, I seek to understand 
what factors have influenced innovation in the limited numbers of states where change has occurred.    
Research Questions  
Structural changes of teacher pensions, which are established through state statute and 
subject to the forces inherent in state long-term obligations and budgeting, face major inertia. Most 
pensions maintain their established (DB) structure, making small adjustments in response to internal 
and external forces. Fluctuations in the system or environment, such as ideological changes shifting 
citizenry demands or elections varying political party majorities, recessions or fiscal shocks, changing 
demographics, and interest group pressures for or against reform, often fail to incite more than 
modifications to pension plans, typically targeted at the benefits of future employees. However, 
sometimes this inertia is overcome, and a state enacts structural changes. Although few in number, 
these structural changes appear to be to be increasing in frequency; two states changing from 1991 – 
2000, four from 2001 – 2010, but seven enacting reforms from 2011 – 2017. This rise in adoption 
rates raises the number of adopters to observe and provides an opportunity to examine why some 
states have moved forward with structural reforms while others have not. This points to other 
internal or external determinants, possibly acting together, which influence legislative actions and 
ideas towards restructuring. However, these forces may act earlier in the legislative process. 
For a policy to become enacted, it first has to be introduced into a legislative committee, 
proceed from the committee to the chamber floor, be approved in both chambers of the legislature 
(one in Nebraska due to its unicameral system), and then be signed into law by the governor. This 
provides several steps wherein the internal and external forces that impact pension structural reform 
influence adoption. The factors that are significant at one stage may differ from those that impact 





happen is to misidentify aspects of why it may or may not have been considered or progressed. 
Therefore, to more clearly understand why some states have privatized while others have maintained 
their defined benefit structures, this paper asks four questions: 
1. What mechanisms affect whether legislation to structurally change a state teacher pension plan is introduced 
in the state legislature? 
2. If teacher pension structural change legislation is introduced in a chamber, what factors determine whether 
the change mandates an actual change in structure or directs a study to change the structural form of the 
current teacher pension plan? 
3. If legislation to structurally change the state teacher pension plan is introduced, which factors impact 
whether the proposal; (1) Dies in committee, (2) Dies on a chamber floor, or (3) Passes in a chamber? 
4. What mechanisms affect adoption of state teacher pension plan privatization between 2000 and 2017? 
Limited research has focused on structural reforms of public pension plans. A majority of 
the literature is from organizations with a special interest in either maintaining the status quo or 
pushing a reform agenda (Costrell et al., 2011; Gais & Yakoboski, 2013; Johnson et al., 2012; Weller, 
2013). These studies are often accompanied by media reports highlighting either the precipice of the 
current public pension “problem” or the failure of states and governments to adequately deliver on 
their promises (Costrell & Podgursky, 2010a; DiSalvo, 2019; Lowenstein, 2005; McGee, 2019; Will, 
2019). Authors have examined structural pension reform diffusion at the international level (Brooks, 
2005, 2007; Hennessy & Steinwand, 2014; Holzmann, 2013; Orenstein, 2013; O. Schneider, 2009). 
However, I am unaware of any examination of the diffusion of structural pension change of teacher 
pensions across the fifty states. Analyses of teacher pension reforms typically focus on a limited 
number of states and how those reforms affect teacher behaviors or perceptions (Chingos & West, 
2015; Goldhaber & Grout, 2016a) or on how changes or modifications to existing plans and 





2009; Koedel, 2016; Munnell et al., 2004; Ni & Podgursky, 2016) rather than the mechanisms that 
led to the change legislation itself. Furthermore, these studies have mainly focused on the internal 
environment that has influenced change, and the outcomes of these changes.  
Focusing solely on the internal determinants and environments of policy change limits the 
understanding of the forces which impact innovation. Changes seldom occur in a vacuum; internal, 
external, and vertical forces combine to provide impetus or impede motivation to make changes or 
institute a new design. Berry and Berry (1990) identified this shortfall and opened a rich new lens 
through which to examine policy adoption, a unified model incorporating event history analysis. 
Using this approach, I endeavor to measure the impact of political, economic, geographic, and 
societal factors on structural pension plan changes. The purpose of this paper is to identify factors 
that may influence or precipitate the diffusion of plan changes across the United States, either actual 
or proposed, to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the educator pension model. 
This paper uses a national dataset, constructed by the author, compiled from various primary 
and secondary public datasets. The data builds on teacher pension plan structural changes since 
2000, identifying those plans that have changed to a privatized primary option, incorporating state 
political, economic, and demographic data, state education and funding data, strength of unions, and 
national economic indicators. This dataset will be used to identify factors that ultimately influence 
the diffusion of structural plan changes, from the introduction of legislation through structural 
change adoption, across the states. I employ event history analysis modeling, using state-year 
observations commencing in 2000, based on data availability limitations, to identify those factors 
that predict the various stages of legislative pension plan innovation.  
This paper provides evidence of internal determinants and diffusion mechanisms that 
predict an increased probability of change. In the current economic climate, with ballooning deficits 





predictors provides researchers and policy-makers a better understanding of when, how, and why 
the deferred aspect of teacher compensation may change. Additionally, knowledge of the factors 
that influence the passage of pension reform can inform policy entrepreneurs regarding settings and 
circumstances when windows of opportunity are available which may enhance pension reform 
adoption. This paper does not endeavor to examine, nor explain, which competing values are being 
sought, but points to instances or areas where deeper explorations of factors can provide a richer 
understanding of motivations that drive individuals or legislatures in their resource allocation efforts 
through the vagaries of the policy-making process. Furthermore, a dataset compiling the information 
of the many factors that influence pension plan innovations is nonexistent. To examine changes, 
information from several different sources needs to be obtained and compiled. This paper, and the 
resultant dataset, will provide future researchers with an initial reference from which to expand and 
delve deeper into those areas which impact state teacher pension reform across the U.S. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents the literature review 
and framework for the study. I use both internal and external factors, combining them into Berry 
and Berry’s (1990) unified model. Chapter 3 describes the methods, models, and variables that 
motivate the study. I employ event history analysis, using a discrete time hazard model. Outcome 
variables are dichotomous or ordered categorical variables indicating proposal and enactment of 
pension change legislation and independent variables are divided into political, economic, plan 
attribute, and external determinants. Chapter 4 presents my results, delineated by the four specific 
research questions. Chapter 5 presents my discussion of the results, including the limitations of the 







CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Prior to examining the literature and theoretical frameworks that guide this research, I begin 
by presenting the design and development of teacher pensions in the United States. The origins of 
many of the arguments and concerns regarding current pension structures and reforms are founded 
on the rationale behind the initial design of these systems and of the teaching profession. The 
structure of the most prevalent option, the designed benefit plan, and the legal and Constitutional 
battles that have been brought forth when change threatens this form, impact individuals’ and 
governments’ ability to innovate in the area of state pensions. Opposition contributes to tinkering 
on the edges with decreased benefits for future employees, until internal and external pressures force 
changes on the current structure. Thereafter, shifts in internal political, economic, or demographic 
constructs, or changes in peers or neighbors, may trigger the adoption of change in others.  
Teacher Pension History 
The first U.S. pensions were offered to military members after the Revolutionary War. These 
were primarily designed to provide income for those injured in battle and no longer able to work. 
Through time, pensions were expanded from disability to provide performance incentives, arrange 
for orderly turnover (an individual often worked until death as most had no other form of income), 
and in response to political pressure (Clark et al., 2003). As military pensions proliferated, other 
professions came to be regarded as deserving of pension protections. The earliest state and local 
employee retirement plans were offered by large cities; primarily to police officers and firefighters 
(Hansen, 2010). Federal social security legislation in 1935 stimulated for state and local governments 
to cover employees and led to an expansion in plans. Nearly half of early state and local pension 





Like police and firefighters, schoolteachers elicited early support. Although the job was not 
fraught with the same physical dangers, political framing based on the composition of the teaching 
workforce played an important role in plan evolution. Historically, teachers were primarily young, 
underpaid, single women who earned low salaries, were faced with a rising cost of living, and were 
bound to a location by family ties, thus unable to pursue higher salaries elsewhere (Graebner, 1980). 
“The willingness of policymakers to help elderly teachers related to the fact that so many teachers 
were women, and those who were still teaching in old age were likely to be unmarried (marriage was 
often a cause for dismissal) and too poor to take care of themselves after years in low-paying jobs” 
(Hansen, 2010, p. 404). The social justice movement of the early twentieth century found, “single, 
female, and poor, the average public-school teacher was a perfect candidate for aid; even a society 
interested in retirement for its contributions to social and economic efficiency could hardly fail to 
appreciate the plight of the teacher and the benefits to be gained by conceptualizing retirement as a 
movement with human origins” (Graebner, 1980, p. 104). A DB pension, through providing a 
lifetime stream of income to these deserving individuals, provided a method to ensure equitable 
compensation. However, not all individuals saw these initial efforts as equitable. Income, position, 
age, and sex provided major lines of division, with age being the most divisive. Many young teachers 
were opposed to plans where they would forfeit all, or most, of their contributions if they left the 
system, especially in systems where the vesting period exceeded twenty years; younger teachers also 
protested using their funds to pay for older workers’ retirements (Graebner, 1980). These same 
divisions continue to permeate pension equity tensions today.  
Though most initial public pension plans were local, states eventually became involved in 
public pensions. Massachusetts established the first state public employee pension in 1911. State-
sponsored plans spread fairly rapidly, and by the late 1920s, 23 states maintained some type of plan 





constitutions contained home-rule clauses. These clauses gave state legislatures veto power over 
local or municipal provisions, especially in public finance. Home-rule was enforced most strongly in 
the Southern states, under the aura of reconstitution. Enforcement resulted in state incorporation of 
many local plans, leading to only a limited number of plans remaining at the city or municipality 
level; these were predominantly in the North (Clark et al., 2003), including New York City, Chicago, 
Saint Louis, and Kansas City which have offered researchers limited settings to explore the impact 
of pension differences and borders. However, the growth of “deferred compensation” plans 
depressed teachers’ current wages, a consequence supported by national boards and the National 
Education Association at that time. If teachers were to be provided with a pension gratis (the 
employer at this time made all the contributions), then the wage scale could, and should, remain 
lower (Graebner, 1980). This idea may still depress wages in today’s educator labor market.  
The impacts of current teacher pension structures on the teacher labor market are not well-
understood. Similarly, limited research has sought to identify how more recent societal changes have 
affected the constructs and motivations of these predominantly defined benefit plans. Counter to 
the arguments initially presented for the imposition of defined benefit plans, mobility of younger 
workers has increased and their outlook on pension needs and structure has changed. Limited 
studies have relied on empirical evidence to identify the extent to which liberty is impacted through 
restricting pension choice and on what effect these restrictions might have on the teacher labor 
force. Applying labor theory to the pensions prevalent in today’s teacher labor market, Koedel, et al., 
(2013) state, “in the absence of formal evidence, we note that economic theory suggests that heavily 
backloaded teacher pension plans will not be an effective recruiting tool for high-quality young 
teachers, particularly as the workforce becomes more mobile” (p. 592). Costrell and Podgursky 
(2010b) further state, “traditional teacher pension plans have long been understood to concentrate 





incentive to join the state’s workforce unless they plan to remain on the payroll for at least 25 years. 
Those who leave their jobs earlier forgo nearly all retirement benefits from the employer. The more 
mobile the workforce and the stronger the desire to maintain the option of changing careers or 
moving to another state, the more this benefit structure discourages workers from entering state 
employment. Recent studies have found that lack of pension portability is a major frustration for 
younger teachers in Massachusetts, newer entrants in Washington were much more likely to choose 
a hybrid or DC plan to a DB option, and when Florida teachers were presented with a choice of 
plans, a majority chose a DC option (Chingos & West, 2015; Goldhaber & Grout, 2016b; Tran & 
Huang, 2009). The preference for a portable pension was even greater for teachers who taught in 
science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) subjects, a group that is already more difficult to 
attract and who are most responsive to compensation differences (Adamson & Darling-Hammond, 
2012; Chingos & West, 2015; Odden et al., 2003).  
Simultaneously, retirement ages have decreased. In recent decades, evidence has grown that 
many plans, both in the private and public sector, may have actually shortened professional careers 
by encouraging early retirement (Podgursky, 2011). In 1900, over 70 percent of men over 65 were 
engaged in gainful employment (women were still excluded from much of the workforce). Policy-
makers envisioned 65 as the age at which older workers (principally men) became incapable of 
working efficiently. By 1990, only 20 percent of men over 65 were gainfully employed (Blundell et 
al., 2016). Although these figures are for the workforce as a whole, the decrease in retirement age 
was especially prevalent in teaching. While the current average age for retirement is near 60, teachers 
retire in their mid-fifties (Costrell & Podgursky, 2007). A benefit system that encouraged early 
retirement might have made sense a generation ago as many highly educated women and young baby 
boomers entered the labor force. Inducing still-productive older workers to retire early makes little 





motivations and behaviors might be affected by different pension structures, it is important to 
understand which forces and determinants might precipitate such reforms. 
Policy Innovation and Change 
The study of policy innovation and diffusion is an attempt to understand policy change. 
Since the seminal works of Mohr (1969), Walker (1969), and Gray (1973), policy scholars have 
theorized that innovations are driven by internal determinants or through external diffusion 
mechanisms. While internal determinants models hold that the internal political, economic, and 
social characteristics of states are the most important factors explaining the adoption of reforms, 
models of policy diffusion posit that the policy choices of other jurisdictions are most influential in 
explaining the adoption of a given innovation. Although most scholars agreed that policy change 
was unlikely to be driven by one or the other, early studies tended to employ solely an internal or 
diffusion model (Hoffer, 2018). The single lens, internal determinants or diffusion, approach 
changed in 1990 with Francis S. and William D. Berry’s study of state lottery adoptions through a 
unified model (F. S. Berry & Berry, 2017). Looking to expand these ideas into other research areas, 
McLendon and Cohen-Vogel (2008) suggest turning to advances from political science research to 
more completely understand the macro-forces that engender education policy innovations, notably 
Kingdon’s (1984) Multiple Streams, Baumgartner’s and Jones’s (2009) Punctuated Equilibrium, and 
Berry’s and Berry’s (1990) Policy Innovation and Diffusion frameworks.  
However, all states and policies do not experience innovative change, some see extended 
periods of stability. This is especially true in policies surrounding budgets and pensions. In this vein, 
it is important to understand Lindblom’s (1959) incrementalism policy adoption theories, specifically 
in light of Wildavsky’s (1974) The Politics of the Budgetary Process. This section begins with the literature 
and frameworks of internal determinants, discussing both the forces that drive incremental change 





discussion of internal determinants that elicit change, I present the literature surrounding diffusion 
mechanisms before presenting more recent developments of the unified model approach. These 
frameworks will provide the basis for the study of state teacher pension plan structural reforms.   
Internal Policy Change – Incrementalism and Punctuated Equilibrium 
The “internal determinants” explanation argues that state governments innovate when their 
political, economic, and social environments are favorable for doing so. These theoretical 
frameworks build upon incrementalism (small changes and constant evolution) and punctuated 
equilibrium (interrupted by periods of rapid change). Understanding state policymaking and policy 
change requires that we understand what mechanisms contribute to both the small incremental 
changes to existing policies as well as the larger, non-incremental adoptions of policy innovations (F. 
S. Berry & Berry, 2017; Shipan & Volden, 2012). 
Incrementalism. Lindblom (1959) espoused that policy changes were a result of political 
bodies “muddling through” the political process. Political decision-makers, when formulating 
policies, are not endowed with unlimited knowledge, time, or resources, conditions required for fully 
rational decision making. Decision-makers are limited by processing limits; procedural, which limit 
how decisions are made, or substantive, which impact or affect particular choices directly (B. D. 
Jones, 1999). Given policymakers' limited time and imperfect information, they are forced to settle 
on their impressions of the best choice given these constraints; these constraints can also apply to 
legislative bodies (Cairney & Jones, 2016, p. 42). Politicians and legislative bodies often make 
limited, reversible changes in the status quo due to their limited abilities to accurately predict the 
long-term impacts of their decisions (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Lindblom, 1959). The few 
alternatives which are considered often meet only one or two primary objectives. Since this only 
partially achieves all goals or objectives, the process is continuously repeated resulting in constant 





italics in original). “Most of the time, policy is supported by stalemate, rather than satisfaction, with 
key figures in the policy monopoly committed to working within institutional politics to achieve 
marginal reforms in the direction of their preferred ultimate policy” (Meyer et al., 2005, p. 17). 
Further constraints affect a government’s budgetary process. Aaron Wildavsky (1974), in 
examining how the national budgeting process actually worked, revealed the highly competitive 
nature of budget formation, the complexity of budgetary decisions, and the need of budget actors to 
specialize and “satisfice” to contain conflict. In defining the importance of examining changes and 
priorities in budgets, Wildavsky noted, “if politics is regarded in part as conflict over whose 
preference shall prevail… the budget records the outcomes of this struggle” (p. 4). Government 
budgetary politics can be viewed as legislators and legislative bodies playing the highly stylized 
institutional roles of guardians (of the public purse) and spenders (Kelly & Wanna, 2000). Spenders 
advocate for their budgetary needs while guardians ensure spending does not go beyond available 
resources. These roles may be the result of party affiliation or electoral platforms. Both roles seek to 
exert influence through garnering political support and are required to resolve budgetary decisions. 
These parties also contribute to the bounded rationality of the political process. They simplify the 
issues by limiting the focus of discussion or excluding specific types of expenditures thus leading 
budget decision-makers to satisfice rather than comprehensively reviewing all possible options and 
budgets (or budgetary programs) to change incrementally. These roles impact all aspects of a states’ 
budget, including public funding for education. Pay and benefits, including current and future 
educator pension liabilities, comprise a majority share of states’ education budgets. 
Punctuated Equilibrium and Windows of Opportunity. Although a majority of policy 
action consists of incremental changes to existing policy, occasionally major disruptions do occur. 
Baumgartner and Jones (2009) described these disturbances as “punctuated equilibrium” (PE), long 





equilibrium theory provides a modified conception of evolutionary policy processes, relating to the 
major disruptions in the way that policymakers think about, and try to solve, policy problems. 
Baumgartner and Jones (2009) argue incremental change in most cases is accompanied by seismic 
change in a small number of cases (p. xxii). Policy change is in part, about tailoring general policy 
ideas to fit the particular policy problems that are currently attracting decision-makers’ attention and 
getting decision-makers to pay attention to particular policy problems (framing). To explain these 
larger changes, identified as “innovations”, Mohr (1969) posited that “innovation is directly related 
to the motivation to innovate, inversely related to the strength of obstacles to innovation, and 
directly related to the availability of resources for overcoming such obstacles” (p. 114). When shifts 
occur in resources or motivations, innovations might follow. 
In his multiple streams approach (MSA) framework, Kingdon (1984) identified these periods 
of reform as “windows of opportunity”. For a significant change, or innovation, to occur, a policy 
window opens when three usually separate and independent streams — the problem stream 
(governmental or public perception of a problem), the politics stream (change in public sentiments, 
change in governments, etc.), and the policy stream (available solutions) — intersect. The MSA 
framework helped advance evolutionary policy theory, originally adopted from biological studies. 
“Evolutionary policy theories seek to explain how and why particular environments operate to help 
produce specific kinds of policy change and stability, and how actors, such as policy entrepreneurs, 
adapt to or help shape their environments” (Cairney & Jones, 2016, p. 41). Policy entrepreneurs, 
within and outside government, constantly seek to influence and shape the agenda by advancing 
their developed “solutions” as politics or perceptions change. Entrepreneurs seek to take advantage 
of rising attention to a particular issue, dramatize a situation (create a problem), or advance a 
particular problem definition. Involvement of these “experts”, the choice of institutional venues in 





with the creation of a particular policy image allowing the attachment of a particular solution to the 
problem have been identified as motivators which can influence policy innovation (Baumgartner & 
Jones, 2009; Jann & Wegrich, 2006; Diane Stone, 1999).  Furthermore, interest group competition 
shapes subsystem dynamics by constraining and providing opportunities for policy makers. Though 
interest groups often attempt to foster stability, they can act as drivers of volatility through 
competition for policy makers’ attention and introduction of solutions to issues (Sabatier, 1988). 
With budgets being the visible outcome of policy debates (Wildavsky, 1974), budget 
authorizations become the most important output of a complex process of governmental attention 
allocation and decision-making (Baumgartner et al., 2009; Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Sebők & 
Berki, 2017). “State budgets were seen as the primary way in which governments affected policy, and 
also signified the importance of the different values held by political actors and the society they 
represented” (Mokher, 2008). Although initial budgeting studies focused on the stability of budgets, 
later researchers noted long periods of incrementalism punctuated by bursts of rapid change 
(Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; B. D. Jones et al., 1997; Wildavsky & Caiden, 2004). Thus, punctuated 
equilibrium theory situated both stability and change as periods of overarching budget dynamics 
(Sebők & Berki, 2017). These periods of sudden or abrupt levels of budgetary change have been 
identified with reelection‐based incentives to represent public opinion, spending pressures exerted 
by special interests, and the makeup of the state bureaucracy (Mortensen, 2009; Robinson, 2004). 
Wildavsky (1974) found dissensual budgeting, those periods of legislative disunity, led to 
larger and more rapid changes. Jones et al., (1997) further noted that a divided government reduces 
institutional gridlock and increases the probability of rapid change in budget volatility. Additionally, 
in examining periods of change in the budgets from different levels of government, Jones et al., 
(2009) found more stability and incremental change in lower-level budgets than in national budgets. 





structures, which might vary in reaction to public and electoral pressures, especially if coupled with 
an economic shock. The authors found that the concept of punctuated equilibrium disproves classic 
incrementalism as a general rule of budgeting, but retains it as a partial component of such a general 
rule in that it explains the vast majority of budgetary changes (B. D. Jones et al., 2009). Incremental 
changes and punctuated equilibrium, particularly in terms of state budget policies, focus primarily on 
the internal influences. However, research has demonstrated the need to consider external forces 
which might motivate policymakers to consider or enact change.  
External Mechanisms – Policy Diffusion 
In our federal system, composed of fifty interconnected yet individual sovereign governing 
bodies, each state has the opportunity to learn from, and at times, compete and react to others. 
Through this learning, competition, and reaction, policies are enacted or reformed across 
jurisdictions (states). Berry and Berry (2017) cite Rogers’ 1995 definition of policy diffusion as “the 
process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the 
members of a social system” (p. 256). Walker (1969) identified this diffusion mechanism via state 
interaction in policy design and implementation. Seeking to explain the way states select a solution 
from a list of available options that best meets their needs, Walker identified several social and 
political factors that affect the diffusion of policy. Walker posited that to narrow the extensive and 
sometimes complex field of choices, decision-makers, in this case, legislatures, will rely on others 
near or similar to them who have faced comparable decisions. Gray (1973) expanded this idea 
through empirical analysis of three separate policy areas. Although noting that some internal 
characteristics of states make diffusion and adoption either more or less feasible, she also identified 
differences based on policy area and federal involvement. From this early framework, numerous 
studies looked at how and why policy diffuses with a majority separating internal determinants from 





and Gray (1973) with the internal determinants theories of Mohr (1969) to analyze state lottery 
adoption. The researchers argued that states would not blindly adopt other states’ policies without 
being influenced by internal determinants, but neither would internal factors not be impacted by 
external forces. The authors identified diffusion mechanisms as resources to overcome innovation 
obstacles, thereby combining internal and external determinants into one model. 
Through this work, the authors proposed a new way to examine and understand how or why 
states adopt policies combined with when or how they do. This framework, using a unified theory of 
internal and diffusion determinants and an event history analysis modeling method, has formed the 
baseline for hundreds of researchers and analyses from local to international policy adoptions since 
then. These external and internal factors led to researchers examining the influence of interest 
groups (Mintrom, 1997), ideology (Grossback et al., 2004), influences of different levels of 
government (Gray, 1973; Shipan & Volden, 2008; Sugiyama, 2012) and then to the examining of the 
influence of the substance of the policies themselves (Makse & Volden, 2011). Additionally, 
although studies have looked at the diffusion of education policies, little has been done to examine 
K-12 teacher labor market policies. Education diffusion studies have focused on the adoption of 
policies surrounding all levels of education, from early childhood education (Cohen-Vogel et al., 
Forthcoming; Curran, 2015; Mintrom, 2001), to school choice (M. D. Jones, 2010; Mintrom, 1997; 
Wong & Shen, 2002) and multi-cultural education (Kellogg, 2015), through higher education policies 
(Cohen‐Vogel & Ingle, 2007; Cooley, 2015; McLendon et al., 2007, 2009). Boushey (2010) further 
reconceptualized policy diffusion dynamics, combining the theories of incrementalism and 
punctuated equilibrium within Berry and Berry’s unified framework. Similar to single state policy 
change, Boushey described policy diffusion as a largely incremental process, punctuated with periods 





Although policy diffusion researchers disagree on the precise number and definitions of 
diffusion mechanisms, five primary factors are most prevalent across the literature. Some authors 
combine two or three various areas into separate categories, but most agree on a theoretical 
framework including the following: learning, imitation, normative pressure, competition, and 
coercion (F. S. Berry & Berry, 2017; Gilardi, 2010; Hoffer, 2018; Shipan & Volden, 2008). The 
relative importance of these various mechanisms has been found to vary across time, issue area, and 
stage of the policy process (F. S. Berry & Berry, 2017; Graham et al., 2013; Karch, 2007; Shipan & 
Volden, 2008). The following sections define each of these forces, identifying the overlaps in the 
definitions and expanding on intricacies in mechanisms that researchers have sought to use to study 
policy diffusion dynamics. While not all mechanisms are equally impactful drivers of teacher pension 
policy change, examples of each are presented below.  
Learning. Learning is a process where one unit’s policies are influenced by consequences of 
similar policies in other units. States or jurisdictions learn from others who are similar to themselves 
(Gilardi, 2010, 2016; Nicholson-Crotty & Carley, 2016; Seljan & Weller, 2011; Shipan & Volden, 
2008). Brooks (2007) noted, “an important source of policy innovation is the process by which 
governments learn from each other” (p. 701); Berry and Baybeck (2005) added, “when confronted 
with a problem, decision-makers simplify the task of finding a solution by choosing an alternative 
that has proven successful elsewhere” (p. 505). Diane Stone (1999) identified a learning mechanism 
as “conditions of uncertainty – brought on by crisis and political conflict, the absence of a scientific 
consensus or a lack of information, or by new problems and policy disasters – potentially induces a 
proclivity among policy makers to look to experiments elsewhere that have been developed in 
response to similar conditions of uncertainty” (p. 54). Gilardi (2010) found that policymakers are 
more likely to imitate a policy if it has been shown to be compatible with the reelection of those 





their experience more credible and relevant to the challenges of implementing policy change in one’s 
own locale (Brooks, 2007; Hennessy & Steinwand, 2014). Governments often look towards peers 
when seeking information on policy innovation or reforms. Brooks (2005) noted that “cues are not 
taken from any prior reform decision, but rather are drawn from a particular set of prior adopters, 
namely ‘‘peers’’. Peers are jurisdictions with comparable geopolitical, economic, and cultural 
landscapes, as well as those that belong to common economic or political organizations” (p. 280).  
Imitation. Beyond learning from peers, jurisdictions adopting policies previously enacted by 
others may do so to imitate or “look like” them. This may be due to a previous adopter being seen 
as a leader (Shipan & Volden, 2008) or the government/leaders being worthy of emulation (Gray, 
1973), or to follow partisanship or ideology (Grossback et al., 2004; Volden, 2006). Meseguer (2004), 
in a study of pension privatization across Latin America and the OECD, found that reforms enacted 
by peers provided the strongest predictors of a government’s decision to privatize; the author 
attributed these findings to emulation rather than learning due to the uncertainty of long-term 
outcomes. Imitation can also be seen as partial learning – states or jurisdictions with similar ideology, 
partisanship, demographics, etc., adopt or implement a policy or innovation to mimic additional 
characteristics of a previous adopting entity based on perceived prior success from the earlier 
adopter – or as emulation – whereby a majority of other states or jurisdictions are acting or 
implementing policy in a certain manner or area and the later adopter follows to fit in.  
Stone (1999) also describes imitation in the voluntary adoption of other states’ policies as, 
“decision-making elite…import innovatory policy developed elsewhere in the belief that it will be 
similarly successful in a different context” (p. 52). Diffusion through imitation is not the result of 
observing policy effectiveness or political consequences (Hoffer, 2018). Imitation is often 
independent of evaluation, sometimes due to unknown long-term results, such as with pension 





contrast between the mechanisms as, “learning focuses on the action (i.e., the policy being adopted by 
another government), while imitation focuses on the actor (i.e., the other government that is adopting 
the policy)” (p. 257). Including imitation as a separate channel through which policies diffuse 
becomes more critical to the researcher looking at the actors (Shipan & Volden, 2008).  
This research, on structural change to state teacher pension plans, focuses on the external 
forces more than the mechanism for policy diffusion and adoption. Learning and imitation are 
viewed as proceeding through the same channels – implementing an innovation based on a previous 
adoption by a “peer” or neighbor or through acquiring information from an outside source. The 
difficult part of unentangling learning and imitation from a pension standpoint is that the social, 
economic, and distributive implications of pension reform, in this case, pension privatization, takes 
at least a full generation for workers to begin retiring to learn the long-term effects of the change. 
However, in the short term, there may be significant political and financial potential costs or benefits 
to prospective reforms which can influence, or inform, politicians’ willingness to innovate. 
Competition. Policies diffuse through competition mechanisms when one state or 
jurisdiction attempts to achieve a competitive advantage over neighbors or jurisdiction competing 
for limited resources (monies and revenues from lotteries) or to prevent neighbors from “dumping” 
problems (lower welfare subsidies or increased restrictions) (F. S. Berry & Berry, 2017, p. 258). 
Competition occurs when units react to or anticipate one another in the attempt of attracting or 
retaining resources (Gilardi, 2016); it can be offensive (attracting resources from a neighbor or 
competitor), defensive (preventing a neighbor or competitor from dumping or exporting problems 
into your jurisdiction), or anticipatory (sending a signal on possible change). Berry and Berry (2017) 
identify two primary mechanisms for competition diffusion, location-choice and spillover-induced. 
Location-choice competition is defined as seeking to influence location choices where individuals 





adoption of a lottery (W. D. Berry & Baybeck, 2005), restaurant smoking bans (Shipan & Volden, 
2008), changes in individual and corporate tax rates (F. S. Berry & Berry, 1992), and sales tax 
adoptions (Burge & Piper, 2012). Diffusion through competition in policies surrounding the teacher 
labor market, including pension reform is difficult due to each state’s own licensure and tenure 
provisions and the lack of portability of current defined benefit pensions. However, neighbors with 
more attractive compensation options may affect the movement of early-career or entry-level 
teachers, impacting the pressure on legislators representing border-area districts. 
Normative Pressure. A government observes a policy that is widely adopted by others and 
because of shared norms or ideals, adopts the policy (Curran, 2015; Sugiyama, 2012). In the U.S. 
federal system, a state can also be influenced by pressures from the national government; the vertical 
relationship between states and the federal government plays a considerable role (Karch, 2007). 
National statutes influence policy diffusion by affecting the internal factors that make policy 
adoption not only at the state level more or less likely but also at the agenda-setting stage, by 
increasing the political relevance of some issues over others (Gilardi, 2016). This type of diffusion 
may be seen in the establishment of early teacher pension plans during a progressive era in the 
United States; state and national organizations framed teachers as dependent and deserving of post-
retirement care. States sought to “conform” and adopt plans to take care of aging workers in a 
“taken-for-grantedness” scenario (Braun & Gilardi, 2006, p. 311). This mirrored federal government 
efforts to provide for civil service and social security plans to cover older members of society. 
However, at this time, due to the current limited number of states that have adopted privatized state 
teacher pensions and the preponderance of a defined benefit structure in federal programs, 
normative pressure is not a likely mechanism influencing change. 
Coercion. Coercion operates when a higher, or stronger, government or jurisdiction adopts 





subservient or weaker entity (F. S. Berry & Berry, 2017). Examples of coercion in international 
policy diffusion include measures mandating the adoption of human rights protocols and fiscal 
reforms as precursors to European Union membership, or International Monetary Fund or World 
Bank requirements for countries to adopt policies as conditions to receive financial aid (Simmons & 
Elkins, 2004; Weyland, 2005). Private company pension reform diffusion was impacted by ERISA in 
the late 1970s, but the exclusion of public pensions from the Act’s requirements lessened the 
impacts, or influences, of vertical coercion in state teacher pension reforms. 
Conceptual Framework – The Unified Model 
Focusing solely on internal or external mechanisms masks the interdependence of these 
factors and can lead to erroneous findings on which determinants motivate change. This analysis will 
use Berry and Berry’s (1990) premise that the combination of internal and external determinants 
affect state-level policy adoption, a concept they include to construct a unified model of policy 
innovation. Internal determinants can determine whether a policy continues to change incrementally, 
or if windows of opportunity are opened and conditions are right to punctuate the equilibrium. 
However, these periods of rapid change do not occur in a vacuum, information is needed to inform 
governments of available options and potential outcomes; this evidence may come through various 
outside channels via different diffusion mechanisms. The literature covering examples of education 
and pension policy diffusion and adoption using Berry and Berry’s (1990) unified model of policy 
innovation demonstrates that both internal and external political, socio-demographic, interest group, 
economic, and diffusion mechanism variables are critical to explain and predict policy adoption. 
This research builds from Mohr’s (1969) theoretical framework purporting that motivation and 
resources to overcome obstacles foster policy innovations. Motivation and obstacles or barriers 
follow Lindblom’s (1959) incrementalism, especially in the budgeting process (Wildavsky, 1974), and 





on Berry and Berry’s (1990) unified framework for policy innovation and diffusion positing that 
“both internal and regional influences on a state’s likelihood of innovation can be predicted based 
on Mohr’s theory” (p. 396). If motivation to innovate is low, obstacles and resources should have 
little effect on innovation. However, as obstacles decrease and internal or external resources or 
motivations increase, the probability of new policy adoption increases.  
To examine state teacher pension change through a unified model, I combine the effects of 
external mechanisms with several internal lenses; these include political forces, economic forces, and 
the impacts of plan attributes. The following sections delineate these various structures, which, when 
incorporated, constitute the final unified model. 
Internal Political Forces  
The basic assumptions underlying a political focus are that voters and politicians are rational 
actors and each seeks to maximize his own utility. A primary motivating factor of rational elected 
officials is the desire to maintain their position through reelection. Rational voters support those 
parties, and candidates, which will best represent their desires. In a system, where the majority 
decides the outcome, the desires of the individual in the middle of the voting distribution will 
prevail. Individuals, and parties, in power, will converge around this median voter in the electoral 
district and support policies that meet this voter’s perceived preference. Once elected, politicians will 
signal, through proposed legislation and voting behaviors, their effort to represent those forces that 
put, and will keep, them in power (Ahmed & Greene, 2000; Bergstrom & Goodman, 1973; 
Congleton, 2004; Downs, 1957; Mayhew, 1974; Romer & Rosenthal, 1984).  
Several measures have been used to define an electorate’s median voter, the most common 
being the voter with the median income (Bergstrom & Goodman, 1973; Romer & Rosenthal, 1979, 
1982) or ideology (Downs, 1957; Romer & Rosenthal, 1984). Median ideology looks at the aggregate 





preferences are single-peaked. This unifying ideological measure provides for greater stability in the 
political process (Romer & Rosenthal, 1984). An ideological median voter is situated in the middle 
of a liberal-conservative political preference distribution. This individual controls the outcome 
(Downs, 1957; Romer & Rosenthal, 1984) and the preference(s) of this position should prevail.  
While median voter ideology provides one aspect guiding elected official action, partisanship 
offers another. In a study on the effects of district heterogeneity on legislative actions, Gerber and 
Lewis (2004) found that median voter preferences accounted for 37 percent of legislative behavior; 
however, party affiliation accounted for 92 percent. Furthermore, as district heterogeneity increases, 
representatives become more responsive to party pressures at the expense of district median voters. 
Heterogeneity can appear in many guises, from age and race to political ideology and issue salience. 
Parties also act as legislative “cartels”, seizing power to make the rules that govern the structure and 
process of legislation (Cox & McCubbins, 2007). Additionally, the legislative process, particularly the 
committee system, favors majority party interests. Parties, which control member assignments, are 
instrumental in assigning members to committees, typically favoring the desires of a legislator’s 
constituents, which subsequently further the platforms of the party (Cox & McCubbins, 2007).  
To summarize the political frame, an incumbent is motivated to meet a constituency’s 
desires in an effort to remain in office. The median voter, based on a single-peaked, ideological 
continuum, drives the selection of the candidate that best meets her position. Partisanship influences 
political actors’ behaviors, more so as district heterogeneity increases. Furthermore, partisanship 
controls both the process and the structure of the legislative chamber, increasing the probability that 
its legislative agenda is followed, and enacted. 
Economic Forces  
Aging populations, decreasing retirement ages, and longer life expectancies are pressuring 





Holzmann, 2013; Novy‐Marx & Rauh, 2011; Podgursky, 2011; Thom & Randazzo, 2015). 
Recessions affect public debt loads and liabilities (Chapman, 2008; Naczyk & Domonkos, 2016; 
Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). Some nations, and states, react more quickly and effectively to economic 
declines while others languish longer (Poterba, 1994). States react differently to fiscal stress, some 
raise taxes to make up for lost revenues while others might cut spending on goods and services.  
Wildavsky (1974) defines budgets as “links between financial resources and human behavior 
to accomplish policy objectives” and as “a mechanism for making choices among alternative 
expenditures” (p. 2). Decisions made, and policies proposed, that influence how and where money is 
spent, reflect legislators’ preferences. The percent of revenues or total state expenditures budgeted 
towards education signals a level of effort and a priority, which can be seen as a reflection of 
attempts to meet a constituency’s demands.  
Within public sector budgeting, knowledge asymmetries exist. Backes et al., (2016) find, “the 
opacity of pension funding mechanisms makes it politically easy to place the burden of UAALs on 
new and prospective entrants of a particular pension plan” (p. 368), masking impacts from taxpayers 
and voters. However, public-sector workers are more aware of pension promises than ordinary 
voters through union access; thus, these groups tend to be more informed and involved (Glaeser & 
Ponzetto, 2014a). Additionally, with liabilities well in the future, employers often make short-term 
promises, such as current pension increases, to employees, and politicians are reluctant to alter plans 
deemed to attract talent in a tight labor market (Hess & Squire, 2010). This allows politicians to 
make little understood pension change promises or enhancements to gain favor with a more 
informed segment of the electorate while conveying consequences onto future taxpayers. However, 
legislators are also aware of current conditions, such as budget surpluses and increased revenues, and 
can act to control the narrative to the electorate, using this inside knowledge to position needed or 





Additionally, early state policy innovation research found that larger, wealthier, and more 
urbanized states were more likely to innovate in general (Gray, 1973; Walker, 1969). These states 
were theorized to have more resources to draw from combined with a more extensive organizational 
capacity to expedite the adoption of new policies. However, these states often also have larger 
populations requiring greater outlays of expenditures, meaning that revenues and gross state product 
alone do not necessarily apprise a state’s wealth. Thus, per capita measures offer a more accurate 
measure of available wealth to overcome obstacles to innovation. 
Summarizing the economic frame, demographics and fiscal contractions affect pension 
structures and designs. Budgets provide a method through which elected officials and governments 
establish and signal priorities. Public spending and budgeting knowledge asymmetries let politicians 
mask the consequences of actions from taxpayers. Unions may have greater visibility, influencing 
options available to policy actors. Greater available wealth boosts opportunities to innovate. 
Plan Attributes 
Schneider and Ingram (1993) define social construction (or framing) of specific populations 
as, “the cultural characterizations or popular images of the persons or groups whose behavior and 
well-being are affected by public policy” (p. 334). This construction recognizes shared characteristics 
that distinguish the “target population” as socially meaningful and attributes specific, valence-
oriented values and images to these characteristics. These depictions describe groups in positive 
(deserving, intelligent, honest, public-spirited, etc.,) or negative (undeserving, dishonest, selfish, etc.,) 
terms. These groups fall into four primary categories, advantaged, contenders, dependents, and 
deviants. Teachers have been identified as a dependent population, deserving of public support and 
lacking a political voice. However, powerful unions are typically seen as contenders, groups that are 
powerful but negatively constructed and undeserving of greater public support (Schneider et al., 





Historically, policies designed to support teachers, a heavily female group, earning low 
salaries with limited employment opportunities while facing a rising cost of living, and bound to a 
location by family ties, focused on care for life (Graebner, 1980). This constructionist image, 
coupled with an early twentieth-century social justice movement uniting older public sector workers, 
resulted in the early establishment and design of pensions. Governments devised these structures to 
provide for life-long income to an older (an additional dependent category) population following a 
career serving the public. This constructionist framework still exists. Further, with the introduction 
of the national social security program, states were offered the opportunity to enroll their public 
employees into the plan. While most accepted, 13 declined, feeling participation would result in 
double taxation and that they could better provide for their workforce’s futures (Hansen, 2010). This 
implies that in these states, the future income provision for deserving and dependent teachers is the 
responsibility of the state government. Plans may be designed to conform to these ideas. 
Using these internal and external drivers, this study aims to identify the key determinants of 
state teacher pension structural change, from the bill introduction through pension privatization. 
The literature review has traced the history and development of teacher pensions and explicated 
elements and mechanisms that impact policy changes with factors that have been found to influence 
educational, teacher, and pension research. Although there is a wide array of diffusion research, 
much of it focuses on the final results, the adoption of a policy. Additionally, much of the limited 
research focused on pension changes examines national changes across the OECD, private industry 
reforms, or single state modifications. This leaves a wide gap in understanding the forces that 
influence or drive a more complete process of pension policy structural change across states. 
Integrating the political, economic, and social constructionist forces with external diffusion 
mechanisms provides the unified model through which I examine those factors that influence state 







CHAPTER 3: DATA AND METHODS 
 To examine my primary research questions, examining those factors that influence the 
teacher pension privatization legislation process, I employ event history modeling. I begin by 
describing the data sources and dataset that I constructed for analysis. I then provide a detailed 
description of event history analysis and the method in which I plan to use this analytic tool in the 
analysis of pension change legislation. Following my model presentation, I develop the dependent 
and independent variables, including hypotheses based on supporting literature for my choice of 
predictor mechanisms. 
Description of the Dataset 
To investigate my research questions and test my various hypotheses, I amassed a 
longitudinal panel dataset, including key economic, political, and education indicators of the states 
identified by previous research as influential in impacting policy adoption or pension change. The 
main dataset contains data for 50 states for the period 1999 through 2017. The year 2000 is chosen 
as the start of analysis due to limitations of earlier state pension data availability and consistency. 
This is one year before Ohio became the third state to sign pension privatization, but results in the 
loss of West Virginia and Washington in the analyses due to prior enactment of legislation, although 
in 2005, West Virginia reentered the risk set after eliminating its defined contribution plan and 
reverting to a defined benefit structure. Specific economic and ideology variables were collected 
from 1999 to allow the use of lagged indicators in these areas. The year 2017 is the last year for 
which the complete data were available at the time of the study.  
The final analysis dataset is limited to include information on 49 states; Washington is 





following its reinstitution of a defined benefit structure. Nebraska, due to the unicameral structure 
of its legislature and nonpartisan elections (Doyle, 2006; McLendon et al., 2007), and Alaska and 
Hawaii, due to their non-contiguous borders and geographic isolation (F. S. Berry & Berry, 1990; 
McLendon et al., 2006; Mintrom, 1997), are sometimes excluded from EHA. However, these 
analyses retained all three states and conducted robustness tests to determine the impact of the 
inclusion or exclusion of these states from the models. Alaska’s plan underwent a structural change 
in 2006 and research has suggested that ideological similarities and policy entrepreneurs might be 
more influential than geographic proximity for affecting policy diffusion (Grossback et al., 2004; 
Karch, 2007). Analysis indicated that Alaska and Hawaii both increased the strength of all models. 
Furthermore, Nebraska improved the fit of models examining how far legislation progressed 
(Question 3) and the survival analysis of actual pension enactment (Question 4); for these two 
analyses, Nebraska was retained to increase the observations; however, it was excluded in models for 
questions 1 and 2.  
 The unit of analysis is the state. Only teacher pension plans administered at the state level 
were incorporated in this study; municipal or local plans were not included. This study includes state 
stand-alone teacher pension plans and those that combine teachers with other state government 
employees. The 50 state pension plans currently serve over 14.5 million members, 8.6 million active 
employees, and 5.9 million beneficiaries. The plans have assets of $1.92 trillion and liabilities 
surpassing $2.66 trillion for a nationwide funding ratio of 72 percent (Center for Retirement 
Research, 2020).  
Models 
Researchers have cautioned against focusing solely on the external mechanisms or the 
internal determinants under which policy change or “diffusion” occurs (F. S. Berry & Berry, 1990, 





policy change may more accurately be a result of internal determinants and the independent choices 
of the policy makers. Although the idea for a policy change may be generated externally, the change 
itself may be due to internal constructs. Similarly, internal pressures and influences may call for or 
indicate an environment either conducive or resistant to change, but external forces may pressure 
policy-making authorities to act or refrain. However, much early research on policy adoption 
focused either on the internal or external factors alone, relying analytically on separate tests of the 
intrastate or interstate explanations. These separate analyses failed to account for the causal factors 
specified in each of the rival models. To answer the four research questions posed, I employ Berry 
and Berry’s (1990) unified theory of policy adoption, including both internal and external forces that 
may influence change.  
Following Berry and Berry’s unified theory, my modeling strategy is structured on focusing 
on both internal and external determinants. To examine which factors influence whether legislation 
is proposed and whether the proposed legislation mandates a current pension structure change or 
directs a committee to study the impacts and projected outcomes of changing a current defined 
benefit structure to a privatized option, I will employ a binary logit model. To examine factors that 
influence whether proposed change legislation dies in committee, dies on a chamber floor, or is 
passed by a chamber (not necessarily passed by both or signed into law by the governor’s signature), 
I will employ an ordered logit model.  
Event History Modeling 
Berry and Berry (1990) adopted their unified model and applied it in event history analysis 
(EHA), a form of research adapted from biostatistics, to address the weaknesses inherent in single 
determinant analyses in their examination of the diffusion of state lottery adoption. This powerful 





approach to studying state policy adoption. In the paragraphs that follow, this section will introduce 
event history modeling, including the use of the Discrete Time Hazards Model.  
Structure. The basic form of a unified model utilizing event history analysis combines the 
external diffusion modeling of Walker (1969) with the internal determinants theories of Mohr (1969) 
and Gray (1973). In Berry and Berry’s (1990) state lottery adoption study, the researchers argued, 
“the strength of regional influences on a state’s probability of innovation should vary depending on 
the internal environment in a state. [And if this is the case], both pure internal determinants and 
regional diffusion models would not only be incomplete explanations of state innovation, but the 
failure to incorporate either of these sources of influence (internal or regional) in a theory of state 
innovation may actually prevent the discovery of empirical support for the other” (p. 400). Berry and 
Berry (1990) built on Mohr’s (1969) organizational innovation model (Equation 2), stating that the 
propensity to innovate is a function of “the motivation to innovate, the strength of obstacles against 
innovation, and the availability of resources for overcoming such obstacles” (p. 396).  
ADOPTit=f(MOTIVATIONit, OBSTACLESit, RESOURCESijt) (Eq. 2) 
A state’s (i) probability of policy innovation (ADOPT) at a specific time (t) is a function of the 
MOTIVATION to innovate, OBSTACLES to innovation, and the RESOURCES to implement 
innovation or overcome obstacles. The authors argued that diffusion mechanisms, in conjunction 
with internal elements, acted as resources to overcome innovation obstacles thereby combining 
internal determinants and diffusion mechanisms and re-conceptualizing Mohr’s model in terms of 
the motivation to innovate, obstacles to innovation, and resources for overcoming obstacles 
(Hoffer, 2018). For example, examining internal determinants, decreasing funding levels and tax 
revenues could influence the motivation to innovate, union pressure might act as an obstacle to 
innovation, and public demand could be a resource for overcoming obstacles. In terms of diffusion, 





outcomes (teacher turnover or re-election) in similar states who had adopted such a policy 
(information as a resource) for overcoming the uncertainty obstacle (F. S. Berry & Berry, 1990). 
 Following F. S. Berry and Berry’s (1990) study of the diffusion of lottery adoption across 
state governments, EHA has been used across the policy spectrum and throughout many levels of 
government. Event history analysis has been used to model local adoption of anti-smoking policies 
(Shipan & Volden, 2008) as well as a reexamination of state adoption of lotteries (W. D. Berry & 
Baybeck, 2005; Fay & Wenger, 2016; Mooney, 2001), criminal justice policies (Makse & Volden, 
2011), school-choice initiatives and school reform (Mintrom, 1997; Mintrom & Vergari, 1998; Wong 
& Shen, 2002), early childhood education programs (Cohen-Vogel et al., Forthcoming; Curran, 
2015), and higher education tuition and accountability initiatives (Doyle, 2006; Doyle et al., 2010; 
Gorbunov, 2013; McLendon et al., 2006; Mokher & McLendon, 2009; Tandberg & Lacy, 2014). 
Event history analysis has also been used to study the diffusion of pension reforms, primarily in the 
international arena. Brooks (2005) used EHA to analyze the diffusion of pension privatization across 
59 countries between 1980 and 1999. The author found that reform adoption increased with an 
increase in peer nation adopters; this effect varied regionally. Additionally, even after controlling for 
diffusion mechanisms, internal political and economic determinants were significant predictors of 
pension reforms. Similarly, Hennessy and Steinwand (2014) used event history modeling to 
distinguish the effects of domestic factors, diffusion mechanisms, or economic shock on Western 
European pension reforms. The authors found that economic shock, identified as joining the 
European Monetary Union (the Euro), made pension reform more likely for low and moderately 
indebted countries in the early 1990s, but delayed reforms later in the decade. Domestic factors and 
policy diffusion were also significant, but to a lesser extent than the external economic factors. 
Components. Event history analyses are comprised of a “risk set”, those jurisdictions (U.S. 





reform). The risk set is the “set of [states] who are at risk of event occurrence at each point in time” 
(Allison, 2014, p. 16).  In EHA, no state is at risk of adopting an innovation until at least one state 
has done so (F. S. Berry & Berry, 1990). I begin the observations in 2000, the year Ohio became the 
third state to enact structural teacher pension plan reform and the year before the public plans 
database was established leading to the standardization and availability of many of the economic and 
pension plan variables included in the analysis. Observations terminate in 2017, following, and 
including, the reforms in Pennsylvania and Florida. Once a state adopts a policy, it is no longer at 
risk of adopting it again and thus drops out of the risk set (Wong & Shen, 2002). The dependent 
variable, the probability of whether a state (member of the risk set) adopts a new policy (enacts 
reform) during a specific year, is not observable. However, we can observe whether the state did 
adopt a new policy (typically coded 1) or not (coded (remains) 0) (F. S. Berry & Berry, 2017).  
To motivate an EHA model, the fundamental dependent variable, which controls both the 
occurrence and timing of the event, is a hazard rate (Allison, 2014). The hazard rate “describes the 
risk a unit incurs of having a spell or duration end in some period, given that the spell has lasted up 
to or beyond some length of time” (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004, p. 15). In studies of policy 
diffusion among U.S. states, failure is the adoption of a policy, the risk set includes all states that 
might adopt an innovation, the survival rate reflects the period of time until a policy is adopted, and 
the hazard rate measures the probability (or the risk) that a particular state will adopt an innovation 
during that particular time period (Allison, 2014; Blossfeld & Rohwer, 2019; Box-Steffensmeier & 
Jones, 2004). In EHA, the hazard rate is the “fundamental dependent variable” and is simply the rate 
at which subjects experience the event of interest (Allison, 2014, p. 8). In this study, the hazard rate 
measures the rate at which states enact structural reform of their teacher pension plan. 
Event history analysis is ideal for studying temporal changes (events or transitions), such as 





time intervals between the commencement of the study or entry to a specific state and exit or 
change from that condition (Blossfeld & Rohwer, 2019), modeling “both the duration of time spent 
in the initial state and the transition to a subsequent state” (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004, p. 8). 
Event history analysis uses all available information by modeling the risk of policy change occurring 
during each particular year, using the data based on all the states that have yet to enact change.  
Event history analysis provides a more accurate model than conventional logistic regression 
models. This method allows the researcher to account for both the occurrence and the timing of 
events and to investigate issues that could not be adequately addressed with other analytic 
techniques. Other traditional models, such as logistic regression or time-series methods, have 
limitations in accounting for right censored data which leads to a loss of information, such as the 
timing of the event, and biased estimations. However, EHA utilizes information provided by 
censored cases to produce unbiased estimates (Allison, 2014; Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004). By 
the time the study was conducted, many states had not enacted change (fixed right censored), and 
social and economic conditions varied within states throughout the period of interest. Furthermore, 
EHA allows for time-related changes in values of independent variables and provides an estimate of 
the risk of an event occurring at any given time period. Finally, EHA works well in cases in which 
there is little variation in the dependent variable (F. S. Berry & Berry, 2007). In the period of the 
study, utilizing structural pension reforms to teacher pension plans across the 50 American states, 
there were only 12 structural changes throughout the 18 year study timeframe; most pension 
reforms consisted of incremental changes within existing structures. 
Since the probability of a state enacting pension plan reform will most likely vary over time, 
due to changing political, economic, and social landscapes, the risk of experiencing the event also 
must be allowed to vary across time periods. Early EHA studies commonly employed discrete time 





function. Later models included lowess or spline functions, time-trend, or annual dummy variables 
to better characterize time dependency (Mokher, 2008). More recently, many researchers have 
adopted continuous-time event, such as the Cox Proportional Hazard Model, or discrete time 
hazard models, which provide greater flexibility and accuracy in modeling temporal dependency, or 
the ordering of changes in time-varying covariates with the occurrence of the event of interest (Box-
Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004; Mooney, 2001).  
This study uses models that focus on a single event (enactment of pension structural change) 
coupled with models that incorporate repeated events (legislation introduction and change versus 
study proposals) and models examining competing, or different types of, events (the progress of 
pension change legislation introduction). In cases involving multiple events, such as year-after-year 
legislation proposals, analyses that can incorporate repeated events are preferable to those that focus 
on single events. Additionally, in the analysis of legislation progression, which must pass through 
preceding levels to reach subsequent ones, models that differentiate between types, rather than just 
count events, are required. Failing to account for these various attributes results in the loss of detail 
and information (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004; Hoffer, 2018; Singer & Willet, 2003). As 
suggested by Singer and Willett (2003), Allison (2014), and Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004), 
these analyses use a discrete time hazard model. The model can be adapted to incorporate repeating 
and competing events and the effects of time-varying covariates and is best suited for studying data 
formatted in discrete time intervals, as was collected for this study. 
Discrete Time Hazard Model. Discrete time hazard models (DTH) are widely used for 
analysis, especially when the subjects of interest or explanatory factors are observed at discrete times, 
t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., or where time is measured imprecisely compared to the relative timing of events, 
these specific measures have the same meaning for different individuals, and when there are typically 





analysis, although legislation may theoretically be enacted at any time and on any day that the 
legislature is in session, the observations are grouped into the specific year in which reform is 
proposed or legislation is signed. This leads to both the separation of policy reform data into 
discrete time periods, but also leads to ties in the time of adoption or reform. Additionally, political, 
demographic, and economic variables are reported based on an annual basis. 
A DTH model can be adapted to handle multiple event issues. These multiple events can 
include unordered events of different types, ordered events of the same type, or ordered events of 
differing types (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004; Singer & Willet, 2003). My third research question 
focuses on repeated, sequential, dependent events; a proposal may die in committee, die on the 
floor, or pass a committee, connoting a structured order of events where legislation has to pass the 
committee to reach the floor and then has to pass the floor to pass the chamber.  A DTH model 
allows analysis of introduced legislation progress (RQ 3). The model is designed to handle the issues 
of a specific, bounded order, the lack of equivalent conditions for progression, and the small 
number of occurrences for some outcomes. An ordered DTH model provides greater efficiency 
than a categorical model and relaxes the stronger assumptions of basic OLS. The use of partial 
likelihood estimation allows examination of the order of event occurrence, not on the exact time 
(Allison, 2014). Partial likelihood estimations are consistent and normally distributed, but due to 
losing information based on ignoring the exact timing of event occurrence, the model is not 
efficient, although the loss of efficiency is typically small (Allison, 2014). 
I also employ the exact partial likelihood method, which assumes that tied events arise from 
the use of the discrete-time model, to handle ties in the occurrence of events (Gorbunov, 2013). 
This method has been found to be more accurate than other methods, such as the Breslow and 
Efron approaches, as it calculates all possible risk sets at each tied failure time. Additionally, my data 





appropriate for true discrete temporal data (Allison, 2014; Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004). The 
use of this method produces larger standard errors which could impact the ability to detect smaller 
effects in my findings, especially since the dataset and number of failures are limited. However, I feel 
this will produce the most accurate and conservative final results. Additionally, standard errors were 
clustered at the state level. 
To interpret the results of a Discrete Time Hazard Model, a positive coefficient indicates the 
hazard is rising, or increasing, with changes in the covariate while a negative coefficient indicates the 
hazard is decreasing. Positive coefficients imply shorter survival times (an increased probability of 
change) while negative coefficients extend the status quo (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004; Singer 
& Willet, 2003). To determine actual hazard ratios between individuals (or states), the coefficients 
must be exponentiated – exponentiation provides the differences in the odds of the outcome. I 
present the final model specification following the development of the variables. 
Variables 
 Variables for this study come from numerous reliable primary and secondary sources. These 
sources include, but are not limited to, Book of the States (2020), National Conference for State 
Legislatures (2019), National Association of State Retirement Administrators (2020), Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (2020), Bureau of Economic Analysis (2020), Census Bureau (2020), the United 
States Federal Reserve (2020), and Boston College Center for Retirement Research Public Plans 
Database (2020). Unless otherwise noted, all independent variables have time-varying characteristics 
to reflect changes in states from 2000 through 2017. Appendix B contains a list and codebook of all 
the variables compiled, including their sources, definitions, and explanations of values and 






Summary Statistics of Independent Variables 
 Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
% Senate Republican 793 49.23 18.92 0.00 90.00 
% House Republican 793 48.53 17.80 0.00 87.14 
% Total Republican 793 48.68 17.66 0.00 87.62 
Governor Party 793 0.573 0.495 0 1 
Unified Government 793 0.501 0.500 0 1 
Citizen Ideology 793 51.01 16.24 8.45 97.00 
Lagged Citizen Ideology 793 50.96 16.10 8.45 97.00 
Citizen Ideology Distance 793 16.97 12.72 0.01 58.46 
State Ideology Distance 793 15.80 10.29 0.04 43.02 
Total Number Border Change 793 0.424 0.723 0 4 
Percent Border Private 793 8.116 13.295 0 60.00 
Time Border State Private 793 2.02 3.94 0 19 
Teacher Only Plan 793 0.552 0.498 0 1 
Social Security (Teachers) 793 0.764 0.425 0 1 
Active/Beneficiary Ratio 793 1.975 0.569 0.68 4.28 
State Contribution Rate 793 12.82 6.95 -2.83 91.43 
Emp Contribution Rate 793 6.21 2.68 0.00 14.50 
Plan Funded Ratio 793 78.83 16.94 31.60 125.07 
% Change of Funded Ratio 745 -1.62 5.97 -28.21 62.34 
General Fund % for Educ 793 35.19 11.69 0.00 56.59 
Total Budget % for Educ 793 21.65 5.40 4.09 49.09 
State Revenue Per Capita 793 2373.63 997.43 72.24 7236.87 
Lag St Per Cap Revenue 793 2311.54 963.93 72.24 6212.74 
Deficit Shock Per Capita 793 -63.15 127.85 -1497.19 1012.52 
GSP Per Capita 793 48880.42 9494.44 30561.04 79988.78 
% of Population 65 or older 793 13.56 2.02 5.75 20.10 
% of Labor Force in Union  793 10.61 5.36 1.63 26.70 
% Public Employees in Union 793 31.70 17.82 2.72 72.41 
Lagged US Stock Market 793 5.31 15.25 -33.84 26.50 







Dependent Variables  
Four primary variables of interest reflect the outcomes of the questions. The dependent 
variables are: 1) Bill Introduction – whether ANY legislation was introduced; 2) Change or Study – 
whether legislation commissioned a study or mandated change; 3) Last Action Taken – how far, in 
either chamber, did legislation progress; and 4) Legislation Signed – whether state government signs 
structural teacher pension reform. Table 2 identifies the numbers of states where a bill was proposed 
(RQ 1), mandated a study versus a change (RQ 2), and signed pension change legislation (RQ 4) by 
year. Table 3 presents the last action taken of introduced legislation in either chamber (RQ 3). The 
search strategy I employed to identify bills and actions taken is presented in Appendix A. 
Table 2 
Legislation Introduction, Type of Bill, Pension Structural Change Enacted 
Year Riskset 













2000 48 42 6 4 2 47 1 
2001 47 39 8 3 5 47 0 
2002 47 43 4 3 1 47 0 
2003 47 44 3 2 1 46 1 
2004 46 43 3 1 2 46 0 
2005 46 36 10 7 3 45 1 
2006 46 38 8 3 5 46 0 
2007 46 35 11 7 4 46 0 
2008 46 40 6 5 1 46 0 
2009 46 34 12 7 5 46 0 
2010 46 31 15 13 2 44 2 
2011 44 18 26 19 7 42 2 
2012 42 28 14 13 1 40 2 
2013 40 26 14 11 3 39 1 
2014 39 34 5 1 4 39 0 
2015 39 30 9 8 1 39 0 
2016 39 27 12 10 2 39 0 







Last Action Taken on Structural Pension Change Legislation 
Year 








(3) Study Only 
2000 42 3 0 1 2 
2001 39 3 0 0 5 
2002 43 2 0 1 1 
2003 44 1 0 1 1 
2004 43 1 0 0 2 
2005 36 6 0 1 3 
2006 38 3 0 0 5 
2007 35 7 0 0 4 
2008 40 5 0 0 1 
2009 34 7 0 0 5 
2010 31 11 0 2 2 
2011 18 14 1 4 7 
2012 28 10 1 2 1 
2013 26 7 2 2 3 
2014 34 1 0 0 4 
2015 30 7 0 1 1 
2016 27 10 0 0 2 
2017 24 7 1 2 5 
 
The outcome for questions 1, 2, and 4 will be a binary coded variable; the outcome for 
question 3 is an ordinal value, from 1 through 3. For questions 1 and 4, an outcome of 1 indicates 
whether a proposal was made, or structural pension reform was signed into law in a given year, a 0 
identifies state-years where no legislation was proposed or signed; states that pass legislation are 
dropped from the riskset in subsequent years. For question 2, an outcome of 1 indicates a bill 
proposes a study, 0 indicates a change proposal. For question 3, the dependent variable takes on the 
values of 1 – 3 as defined above. To ensure consistency, states are dropped from the risk set once 
pension change legislation is signed into law, not when it takes effect, as some states sign legislation 





until a change is signed and may experience several occurrences of legislative proposals. This coding 
allows for the examination of the factors that precipitate proposals and studies and to identify the 
forces that affect the legislative process before an actual change to pension privatization. However, 
this does not allow examination of factors that might impact subsequent changes in the level of 
privatization, i.e., a change from a hybrid structure to a defined contribution-only plan. 
This dependent variable represents the instantaneous hazard rate (the probability or risk) for 
introduction, a study, the level of progression, or enactment of pension structural reform. As 
identified in the discussion of EHA and the model sections, the hazard rate is the instantaneous 
probability of a policy shift in any given period; it is the immediate rate of proposal or adoption 
given that the state has survived to the given time without experiencing the event. 
 Independent Variables  
Independent variables consist of a combination of both internal and external factors that the 
conceptual framework and research have shown impact a government’s propensity to adopt various 
policies. Inclusion of previously identified factors into Berry and Berry’s (1990) EHA model 
provides the following construction: 
POLICYi,t=f(POLITICALi,t, ECONOMICi,t, PLAN ATTRIBUTESi,t, EXTERNALi,t) (Eq. 3) 
POLICY, is the dependent variable, reflecting the measure of the probability that a given state (i) will 
propose or enact pension change legislation in a specific time (t). The risk or adoption is a function 
of the POLITICAL forces to innovate, ECONOMIC forces requiring or preventing change to 
occur, the PLAN ATTRIBUTES which influence the perception and requirements of policies to 
care for teachers in legislator’s or the public’s eye, and EXTERNAL MECHANISMS that make it 
easier (provide a blueprint or competition) or harder (foster opposition) to implement innovation. 
Below is an expansion and discussion of the individual variables in each category followed by my 





 Political Factors. State ideology is a measure of where a state lies on a conservative-liberal 
spectrum. Ideological position has been identified as one factor that influences the adoption of new 
policies (W. D. Berry et al., 1998, 2010; Doyle, 2006; Gilardi, 2010; Grossback et al., 2004; 
McLendon et al., 2009; Mokher & McLendon, 2009; Shipan & Volden, 2008; Volden, 2006). 
Researchers have used various methods to calculate states’ political leanings or ideology. Some 
researchers have focused on the partisanship of the state governing bodies; i.e., the legislature and 
governor (Doyle, 2006; B. D. Jones, 1999; McLendon et al., 2009; Mokher & McLendon, 2009; 
Tandberg & Lacy, 2014). Others have used more recent measures combining the government 
makeup with information from state and national elections, roll call votes, interest group rankings, 
and surveys (W. D. Berry et al., 1998, 2010; Doyle, 2006; Grossback et al., 2004; Shipan & Volden, 
2008; Volden, 2006) Recent work has included national election voting to measure overall state 
views (Hoffer, 2018). 
From the initial policy diffusion work, Walker (1969) argued that national organizations 
influence information and idea transfer through two means; associations “facilitate the exchange of 
ideas and knowledge” via conferences and organizational publications, and act as “occupational 
contact networks” facilitating personnel movement, moving ideas with individuals to new positions 
(p. 895). Gray’s (1973) national interaction model contends national communications networks of 
state officials affect learning. Studying the effects and powers of party influence, Aldrich and Rohde 
(2002) found that party leaders, especially on the majority side, have been granted powers that are 
greater than at any time since early in the century. Political leader powers influence the actions of 
party members throughout the government, at all levels.  
Partisanship affects how citizens vote and how elected governments function (Pereira & 
Butler, 2018). It has been found to impact diffusion both through learning (Butler et al., 2017) and 





affect diffusion. Hennessey and Steinwand (2014) found that, “partisan influence across borders can 
take on a positive direction if ideologically similar governments benefit politically from pension 
reform. Conversely, the direction will be negative if pension reform is associated with electoral 
defeat or other negative feedback effects” (p. 483). Furthermore, in studying what information 
legislators seek out to make decisions on policy, Pereira and Butler (2018) found politicians value 
policies endorsed by co-partisans over those from officials across the aisle more so than increased 
information on a policy’s advantages or disadvantages. Partisanship is a major driver of diffusion.  
Researchers have identified that party ideologies influence government actions (Butler et al., 
2017; M. D. Jones, 2010). The Republican Party platform, elected officials, and supporters are 
identified with placing less faith in government authority and more faith in individuals, markets, and 
competition; liberal officials are more likely to put less faith in the free market. Party platforms, 
through state government majorities, impact which types of policies may be considered. Partisan 
influence has been studied against various types of state education policy. Partisanship control of 
legislative bodies also affects the structure and makeup of committees, which is stacked in favor of 
majority party interests. In research on committee governance, scholars have noted that committees 
are typically considered the repository of legislative expertise within their specialized subject area, 
their decisions are usually accepted by the remainder of members of their respective chambers (Cox 
& McCubbins, 2007). This dynamic is reflected in my legislation proposal sample; of the 127 pieces 
of legislation to change teacher pension plans that were proposed into committee, 105 died without 
exiting committee, and of those that exited, over 3 times as many bills that made it out were passed 
on the floor (17 passed the chamber while only 5 died on the floor).   
Chin and Shi (2020) identify budget appropriations as one of a state legislature’s primary 
responsibilities; K-12 education spending historically comprises the largest line item in states’ 





partisanship on K-12 spending, Chin and Shi found that Democratic-controlled legislatures decrease 
per-pupil appropriations by approximately eight percent compared to state houses under Republican 
control. Additionally, the authors found that Democratic control shifted education funding to the 
local level and tradeoffs at the state level were made between welfare programs and the education 
budget (Chin & Shi, 2020). Wong and Shen (2002) used the level of Democratic control of a state’s 
government to examine the effects of legislative ideology on charter school legislation and school 
district takeover but found no statistical impact of legislative party control on either policy choice. 
Doyle (2006) used the percentage of Democrats in the upper house of states’ legislative chambers to 
study support of merit-based student grant programs, again finding a lack of statistical significance.  
However, using Republican instead of Democratic control in a study on school choice bills, 
Jones (2010) found that states with larger margins of Republican control were more likely to bring 
private school choice bills up for a vote, to and through the committee. Similarly, in a diffusion 
study of dual enrollment policy adoption, Mokher and McLendon (2009) found that Republican-
controlled legislatures and previous adoption of innovative education reform were the factors that 
most strongly predicted adoption of these policies. In studying the legislative response to teacher 
pension underfunding, Moe and Anzia (2013) documented the Republican Party’s desire to eliminate 
the defined benefit in public pensions. This desire to move public pensions away from defined 
benefit structures reflects Mokher and McLendon’s (2009) argument that some policy innovations 
are best viewed as “policy privatization”; they provide an opportunity to place greater responsibility 
on the individual by removing the onus of provision from the government, a position more closely 
aligned with a Republican controlled government. 
Examining the effect of individual member’s partisanship and ideological position on the 
probability of municipality adoption of liberally focused (zoning and foreclosure) policies, Butler et 





interest in learning from their co-partisans than from those in the opposing party” (p. 47). Also, 
emphasizing acceptance of a policy by the opposing political party can undermine the learning 
process. Partisanship has an influence, which suggests two probabilities; individuals will be more 
likely to propose or support legislature aligned with their party platform, and bodies with larger 
partisan majorities will be more likely to follow individual party ideological platforms. 
Other authors have argued that partisan makeup or control may not be an accurate measure 
of a state’s ideological position. W. D. Berry et al., (1998) posited that two measures comprise a 
state’s ideology, the state citizen-ideology (the mean position on the liberal-conservative spectrum of 
the state’s active electorate) and the state government ideology (the mean position of the state’s 
elected officials). Rather than using strict party affiliation, which can be misleading, i.e., Southern 
and Northern Democrats were much more ideologically separated in the 1900s, these state-ideology 
measures identify where a state government’s ideology fits on a national baseline and allows a 
standardized cross-comparison of states. W. D. Berry et.al., (1998) developed a measure for citizen-
ideology using interest group ideology ratings of district elected officials, unsuccessful (or 
hypothetical) challengers, and election results. The authors constructed a measure of the state 
government ideology using weighted averages of interest group ratings of the mean ideological 
positions of a state’s delegation to the U.S. Congressional House and Senate and the average 
ideological position of the governor’s party in the state legislature. The measure is later updated to 
include NOMINATE scores rather than interest group ratings for government ideology (W. D. 
Berry et al., 2010). These ideology indices are available from 1960 through 2017. Various research 
has used the raw ideology scores of states to predict policy innovations. Malin (2016) used citizen-
ideology to examine state PreK-12 public education funding effort levels and progressivity. The 
author found that citizen ideology was a strong predictor of state funding effort (the design of a 





(2006) used the W. D. Berry et al. (1998) state government ideology scores to examine the diffusion 
of merit-based student grant programs and found no significant effects. 
In addition to ideology, the unity of a state’s government affects the adoption of new 
policies. Studies have found that when a state government is unified (both chambers of the 
legislature and the governor from the same political party), states are more likely to adopt new 
policies or increase statutory legislation (Huber et al., 2001; McLendon et al., 2007; Tandberg & 
Lacy, 2014). Huber et al. (2001) examined the number and length of state Medicare bills in 1995-
1996 and found that when a state had a unified government, levels of statutory control increased, 
i.e., more and longer bills were passed. McLendon et al. (2007) studied the effect of unified 
government, specifically following a period of divided government within a state, on the passage of 
higher education governance bills and found that “states are more likely to enact governance 
legislation in years in which the legislature became captured by one of the two major political 
parties” (p. 664). However, Tandberg and Lacy (2014), in an examination of 131 postsecondary 
education “finance innovations” over 29 years, found that unified government had no significance, 
either statistically or practically, on whether a state adopted new policies. 
To examine the effect of political forces in my unified models, I will use the following 
variables: Percent of House - Republican, Percent of Senate - Republican, Percent Legislature - Republican, 
Republican Governor, State Government Unity, Governor/Government Unity Interaction, Citizen Ideology. 
Hypotheses for the effect of the political variables on the introduction and results of pension reform 
legislation are presented below. 
Hypothesis 1: An increase in the Total Percent of Republicans will: RQ1 – increase the probability that 
legislation to structurally change teacher pensions will be proposed; RQ2 – decrease the probability that introduced 





Hypothesis 2: An increase in the Percent of House/Senate Republicans will increase the probability that 
legislation to structurally change teacher pensions will exit a committee and pass the floor. 
Hypothesis 3: States with a Republican Governor will be more likely to enact legislation to structurally 
reform the state teacher pension plan. 
Hypothesis 4: States with a Unified Government and a Republican Governor will be more likely to enact 
state teacher structural pension reform. 
Hypothesis 5: States with higher Citizen Ideology scores (more liberal) are: RQ1 – less likely to introduce 
legislation; RQ2 – if introduced, legislation is more likely to mandate a study; RQ4 – less likely to enact legislation to 
change teacher pension plans. 
Economic Climate. Periods of fiscal stress may lead legislators to modify provisions of 
current pay-as-you-go structures, thus shifting the liability burden to future generations. However, 
fiscal crises may provide a window of opportunity to allow legislators or states to push for an agenda 
of reform for their pension plans to mitigate the effects of increasing costs during a period of 
shrinking revenues. Several measures have been used to identify the fiscal stress level felt by a state’s 
governing bodies. A national recession can put financial strains on budgets across the nation. A 
financial crisis lowers equity prices, which currently make up an average of 60 percent of a majority 
of pension plan holdings (Munnell, 2012). Depressed equity asset prices last for an average of 6 
years, post-crisis. Additionally, national recessions raise unemployment for the subsequent 4 years, 
impacting tax revenues and increasing government debt (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009), while housing 
prices and valuations, sources of local revenues, remain depressed for up to a decade (Reinhart & 
Reinhart, 2010). A national recession will raise public awareness of budgets and spending, providing 
increased media attention, support, and motivation to reform stretched pension plans. However, due 
to the time it takes to enact legislation, these effects will not be immediately manifest and changes 





additional resources to cover the transition costs of structural change (Brooks, 2007). Impacts of 
business cycles may be more acute at the state government level. Chapman (2008) found that during 
and immediately following the 2001 recession, state government revenue suffered a disproportionate 
impact, with a majority of studied states experiencing a gap between revenues and expenditures of 
over 10 percent.  
Additionally, not all states may experience the same level of fiscal crisis at the same time. 
Depending on a state’s economic makeup and primary industries, different states are impacted 
earlier or later in a national economic downturn. Occasionally, recessions may be regional, as 
occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Poterba, 1994). Economic declines can result in increased 
unemployment. A decrease in the number of people working affects incomes which impacts state 
sales and income tax revenues. These revenues provide, on average, approximately 70 percent of a 
state’s education budget funds (Guthrie et al., 2007). Impacts may also be felt in real estate markets, 
lowering property values. Decreased valuations affect state and local real estate tax revenues which 
provide approximately two-thirds of local school funding (Guthrie et al., 2007). However, property 
re-valuations are not continuous nor immediate; they occur on differing schedules, from annually to 
every 5-8 years. Delayed valuations mean that real estate tax revenues during the initial year of a 
downturn will remain fairly stable, but will experience a decline in the subsequent years. Depressed 
proceeds, captured in changes in State Revenues and Gross State Product (similar to national GDP) 
from downturns will lag as business, income, and real estate taxes are not collected until future years. 
Due to the delayed impact of fiscal crises on revenues at all levels of governance, both current and 
lagged measures of economic indicators need to be considered in the model.  
Effort is used to define the measure of state spending on education relative to state fiscal 
capacity (Baker et al., 2017). The percentage of the budget that a state spends on education, or 





population and used to identify inequities (Baker et al., 2014, 2017; Berne & Stiefel, 1984; Brunner & 
Sonstelie, 2003; Malin, 2016). Additionally, Malin (2016) found that states with higher citizen 
ideology levels (more liberal) were more willing to provide a higher K-12 funding effort. this points 
to a link between ideology and the percentage a state does, or may be willing to, pay for education. 
With teacher salaries and benefits accounting for between 55 – 60 percent of all education spending 
and over 90 percent of instructional expenditures (Podgursky & Springer, 2011), and states paying 
an increasing average of salary to cover pension expenditures (Costrell & Podgursky, 2009; NASRA, 
2020), states able, and willing, to provide a higher percentage to fund their teachers may be more 
inclined to also fund their pensions.  
Periods of fiscal stress and reduced revenues can also make it difficult for governments to 
maintain fully funded pension levels by meeting their annual actuarial required contribution (ARC) 
(Gais & Yakoboski, 2013). Since pension plans are rarely at risk of default, even if they carry large, 
unfunded liabilities, under-funding is also much more politically feasible than tax increases or cuts in 
other programs (Thom & Randazzo, 2015). During fiscal crises, governments cut pension 
contributions at seven times the rate at which they cut other spending (Splinter, 2017). The lower 
the funded ratio falls, the harder it becomes to make up the budgetary shortfall without raising taxes 
or cutting more visible programs. Moreover, states with smaller long-term funding shortfalls are 
more likely to meet their ARC and maintain fiscally sufficient pension plans (Thom & Randazzo, 
2015). Since 2000, when most plans were fully funded, the funded ratio of teacher pension plans has 
decreased to an average of 72.3 percent, with some state plans nearly fully funded, but with others 
much worse (NASRA, 2020; Rauh, 2017).  
One further measure used to identify disparities in state budgets and revenues which may 
provide an impetus to enact change is the difference between projected and realized revenues and 





be positive (unexpected deficits), due to a drop in expected revenues or a rise in costs, or negative 
(unexpected surpluses), from the reverse. Splinter (2017) identifies this divergence as the Deficit 
Shock, which “captures the difference between what legislators think the budget will look like and 
how it actually turns out” (p. 67). Deficit shocks measure the estimated gap between actual and 
forecasted budgets after adjusting for any within-year legislation affecting changes in spending or 
taxes. Deficit shock (DeficitShock) is calculated by subtracting any revenue shocks (RevShock) from 
any expenditure shocks (ExpShock) for state i in year t using the following equations: 
ExpShockit = ActExpit – ExpectedExpit − ΔSpendit. (Eq. 4) 
RevShockit = ActRevit − ForecastRevit − ΔTaxit.  (Eq. 5) 
DeficitShockit = ExpShockit − RevShockit. (Eq. 6)1 
As deficit shocks increase, monies may be more (unexpected surplus) or less (unexpected deficit) 
available to enact change.  
 To examine the effect of economic forces in my unified models, I will use the following 
variables: Funded Ratio, Percent Change in Funded Ratio, State Contribution Rate, Percent of Total Budget on 
Education, Percent of State General Fund Budget on Education, Per Capita Revenues (current and lagged), Per 
Capita GSP (current and lagged), Per Capita Deficit Shock, Market (current and lagged), State Unemployment 
Rate (current and lagged). Hypotheses for the effect of the economic variables on the introduction and 
results of pension reform legislation are presented below. 
Hypothesis 6: States with a higher pension Funded Ratio will: RQ1 – be less likely to introduce legislation 
to structurally change teacher pensions; RQ2 – have a higher likelihood that introduced legislation will call for a study; 
RQ4 – have a greater probability that pension reform will be adopted.  
Hypothesis 7: States who experience larger decreases in Funded Ratios will be: RQ 1 – more likely to 
propose legislation; RQ 2 – less likely to propose a study; RQ 4 – more likely to adopt a structural change. 
 





Hypothesis 8: States with higher funding efforts (Higher Percent of Budget on Education or Contribution 
Rates) will be: RQ 1 – less likely to propose legislation and, RQ 4 – less likely to adopt a structural change. 
Hypothesis 9: States with a higher level of resources available (Per Cap GSP, Per Cap Rev) will be: RQ 1 
– more likely to propose legislation; RQ 2 – less likely to propose a study; RQ 4 – more likely to adopt a structural 
change. More resources offer more opportunities to overcome obstacles. 
Hypothesis 10: In periods of Recession (Market decline), states will be: RQ 1 – more likely to propose 
legislation; RQ 2 – less likely to propose a study; RQ 4 – less likely to adopt a structural change. Making a 
change costs money, which may not be available during a market downturn, but legislators can 
appear to be meeting the public’s demand by calling for action. 
Hypothesis 11: States with a higher level of Unemployment will be: RQ 1 – more likely to propose 
legislation and, RQ 4 – more likely to adopt a structural change. Increases in unemployment translate into 
future losses of revenues which will affect future budgets and abilities to meet funding requirements 
leading to more immediate actions. Also, higher unemployment decreases public support for budget 
items that move money from welfare and unemployment towards other programs. 
Plan Attributes and Demographics. A. Schneider et al.’s (2014) social construction 
framework views teachers as a dependent population, lacking voice and deserving public support. 
Advocates for teacher pensions have consistently maintained that school systems have a 
responsibility to care for their older employees (Graebner, 1980). Exiting a teacher after 30 years of 
service without any type of social safety net may be politically infeasible. Since the inception of 
teacher pensions, proponents, from the National Education Association to elected officials, have 
argued that a generous lifetime pension was essential to attract and reward those working for 
depressed wages teaching children and helping prevent social upheaval (Graebner, 1980). Other 
public officials are not always viewed in the same regard (A. Schneider et al., 2014). Plans designed 





when state pension plans included teachers, funding ratios increased by 10 percentage points, 
possibly due to union advocacy and shared fiscal responsibilities of local and state governments. 
There may be a greater incentive for elected officials to keep current teacher pension plans better 
funded to avoid media backlash, strikes, or crises. This can provide larger obstacles to overcome to 
make a change. 
Age demographics can play an important role in pension reform. However, the direction of 
impacts is not straightforward. From a financial perspective, increases in the size of the possible 
recipient population (over 65 years old) result in a rise in pressure on the system leading to an 
increase in the likelihood of pension reform. However, as the share of elderly voters grows, pension 
plan cutbacks may become increasingly dangerous for reelection-minded politicians, as pensions are 
typically better understood and salient to elderly individuals and this demographic is more likely to 
vote (Fletcher & Kenny, 2008; Glaeser & Ponzetto, 2014b). In an examination of Western European 
pension reforms in response to the creation of the European Monetary Union, Hennessy and 
Steinwand (2014) found that countries with a higher share of people over 65 years old were more 
likely to implement reform. Additionally, the effect size was larger at higher reform probability 
baseline levels when other factors indicated a higher chance for change. However, the reforms 
examined were not focused on privatization but on state pension provision and funding. Therefore, 
although the share of elderly voters in a state’s population may affect the probability of pension 
reform, changes may be funding or benefit level adjustments to current systems versus structural 
reforms. Furthermore, Booth (2008, 2013) examined the United Kingdom’s pay-as-you-go national 
pension scheme using a public choice framework and concluded that “as populations age, it will 
become increasingly difficult to reform state pension systems. Reform will not be impossible, but 
the process of ‘buying off’ interest groups will be expensive” (2008, p. 4). Using a median voter 





generations were willing to forsake transferring the pension burden to future generations if it 
facilitated reform; this was not the case for older voters. This indicates that as the percentage of a 
state’s population over 65 increases, motivation to reform pension structures will decrease. 
Whether or not public employees are also covered by federal Social Security may also impact 
the probability of pension reform; two factors facing states whose teachers are excluded from social 
security may influence the ability to affect reform. The first is the lack of any social safety net for 
individuals who would be solely covered by a privatized plan. Not all individuals, covered or eligible, 
contribute to pension plans. In the latest data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2020), 94% of K-
12 state-hired public school teachers had access to some type of retirement plan yet only 85% chose 
to participate. Although access and participation in defined benefit pensions were similar, for the 37 
percent of teachers covered by defined contribution plans, only 13% chose to participate, a 36% 
take-up rate. Additionally, private pension wealth accumulation is based on market forces, there are 
no guarantees of final amounts. Teachers who have not contributed to any plan or who retire and 
plan to withdraw funds during a market downturn, may not have sufficient income to provide living 
expenses upon retirement. Secondly, the current cost of Social Security is 12.4 percent of payroll, 
which is generally split between employers and employees (Internal Revenue Service, 2020). Novy-
Marx and Rauh (2014) examined the increase in state and local revenues required to transition public 
defined benefit pensions to privatized options for individuals not covered by social security. Though 
nearly all states without social security coverage would see an overall decrease in revenues required 
to provide pension coverage and fund current liabilities, initial costs would rise as employers would 
have to offer a 6.2 percent pay rise to offset the employee required contribution to social security 
and prevent a net pay cut when these funds are withheld. Salary increases would require increases in 
the education budget and either cuts to other programs or increases in taxes, neither of which is a 





Finally, the actives to annuitants, or contributors to beneficiaries, ratio has fallen from 2.43 
to 1.35 (NASRA, 2020), further stressing the system. Between 2000 and 2017, most states, excepting 
those that closed DB plans to new entrants, saw an increase in active membership. However, these 
increases were modest, with an average growth rate of three percent while the beneficiary averages 
in states remaining in the riskset grew by 87 percent (Center for Retirement Research, 2020). This 
shifts the funding burden on newer teachers, who are already more likely to leave the profession, as 
states continue to grapple with how to balance attraction, retention, and fiscal solvency.  
To examine the effect of plan attributes and demographic forces in my unified models, I will 
use the following variables: Teacher Only Plan, Social Security, Active to Beneficiary Ratio, and Percent of 
Population ≥ 65 Years Old. Hypotheses for the effect of the plan attributes and demographic variables 
on the introduction and results of pension reform legislation are presented below. 
Hypothesis 12: States with Teacher Only Pension plans will: RQ 2 – have higher odds of proposing a study 
rather than a change; RQ 3 – have a lower probability that pension change will reach or pass a chamber floor; RQ 4 
– have a lower probability that pension change will be adopted.  
Hypothesis 13: States where teachers are covered by Social Security plans will: RQ 3 – have a higher 
probability that pension structural reform will reach or pass a chamber floor and, RQ 4 – have a higher probability 
that pension change will be adopted. 
Hypothesis 14: An increase in a state’s Active to Beneficiary Ratio will result in a decrease in the likelihood 
that a state will enact pension structural change. 
Hypothesis 15: States with a higher percentage of its Population 65 or Older will:  RQ 3 – have a lower 
probability that pension change will reach or pass a chamber floor and, RQ 4 – have a lower probability that pension 
structural reform will be adopted. 
External Mechanisms. Berry and Berry’s (1990) examination of state lottery adoptions 





internal structures of an adopter and the eternal forces or resources that jurisdictions would react to 
or look towards for innovation. Expanding on Walker’s (1969) early work, the authors highlighted 
the importance of neighboring states’ policies on diffusion. Since this initial work, other researchers 
have expanded and refined this theoretical innovation. Most of these expansions have focused on 
one of two avenues through which diffusion works (Doyle, 2006). One posits that policies diffuse as 
states gain knowledge or understand options regarding solving a problem or adopting an innovation 
(through learning or emulation) by looking at policies enacted in a set of reference states (W. D. 
Berry & Baybeck, 2005; Brooks, 2007; Gilardi, 2010; Grossback et al., 2004; Mooney, 2001; Shipan 
& Volden, 2008). Lawmakers have limited capacity and resources; when analyzing possible or 
proposed policy innovations, they are bounded by time, knowledge, and information constraints. 
When governments seek information on policy innovation or reforms, they often look to peers. 
Brooks (2005) defines “peers” as, “jurisdictions with comparable geopolitical, economic, and cultural 
landscapes, as well as those that belong to common economic or political organizations” (p. 280). 
To find ready-made solutions, policy-makers will turn to jurisdictions that are close, or similar, for 
information and follow their lead. In pension privatization, Brooks (2005) found that both 
ideological and geographic proximity mattered, and effects were interdependent. This avenue 
identifies the importance of both geographic proximity and ideological similarity.  
Examining geographic proximity, Karch (2007) states, “the existence of a public policy in 
nearby states provides a model on which state officials can draw and, perhaps more problematically, 
that this model makes the enactment of the policy more likely” (p. 57). Although recent work has 
identified a shift over time in the importance of geographic versus ideological proximity diffusion, 
and some of the empirical evidence for its effect is weak, geographic proximity is still a widely used 
measure in the existing literature (Gorbunov, 2013; Mallinson, 2021). Mooney (2001) noted that half 





Shipan and Volden (2008) note that the higher the proportion of neighbors who have already 
adopted a policy, the greater is the opportunity for learning. 
The second method for diffusion purports that states compete for an advantage or seek to 
prevent a loss, whether for scarce resources or in an effort to maintain or protect an image or citizen 
support (F. S. Berry & Berry, 1990, 2017; W. D. Berry & Baybeck, 2005; Burge & Piper, 2012; 
Curran, 2015; Simmons & Elkins, 2004). Image may have played a role in the early adoption of plans 
to care for aging teachers, as states or governments may not have wanted to appear as uncaring or 
non-supportive of this deserving and dependent population (Braun & Gilardi, 2006). This facet of 
maintaining or projecting an image may be influenced by the social construction of the teaching 
profession, and the level of support for teachers in a state. Concerning competition for scarce 
resources, such as hard-to-fill subject areas and specialist teachers, the more options available 
nearby, the more a teacher may be influenced to move. Furthermore, Karch (2007) expands on 
competition by stating, “[a] public policy may also diffuse because officials believe that the failure to 
adopt it will put their state at a competitive disadvantage, making them feel pressure to keep up with 
their colleagues in other jurisdictions” (p. 62). Policymakers may be influenced to adopt a policy that 
appears to make their state relatively more attractive than a neighbor. Similar to F. S. Berry and 
Berry’s (1990) findings in competition for lottery revenues, legislators near areas where teachers may 
have more desirable options may harbor thoughts of reform; this may manifest at the state level.  
Just as it is unrealistic to assume that a state in competition for valuable resources, such as 
experienced or hard-to-fill teachers, will not react to changes in neighboring states, it is equally 
unlikely that states’ governing bodies are not influenced by their citizenry and will look towards 
others similar to them for ideas on how to address “needs”. Looking towards “others like them” can 
be in different forms – from state or citizen ideology to legislative makeup. However, as states look 





to adopt innovations. Similar to using the likeness of states measured by their government partisan 
similarity, authors have examined how the size of the difference between W. D. Berry et al.’s (1998, 
2010) measures influence policy adoptions. Research shows that ideological preferences of state 
governments that have enacted particular reforms affect the probability of ideologically similar states 
to follow suit (Gorbunov, 2013; Grossback et al., 2004; Volden, 2006). Using an absolute difference 
between state and citizen ideology scores, Grossback et al. (2004) examined state policy innovations 
in electricity regulation, welfare policy, hate crimes legislation, and HMO reform. The authors found 
that states tend to mimic previous adopters with a closer ideological similarity, regardless of 
geographical proximity. Volden (2006) employed a directed dyad-year event history analysis 
approach to examine how political characteristics, and closeness, impact the adoption of children’s 
health insurance programs finding that increases in state ideology differences lowered the chance of 
policy adoption. To measure state ideological distance from previous adopters, I use Grossback et 
al.’s, (2004) formula whereby the distance is for each potential adopter is calculated as: 
Ideology Distance = ABS([(LatestAdopterIdeology+ AllOtherAdoptersIdeology) / 2] – PotentialAdopter) (Eq. 7) 
If previous adopters and potential adopters are both moderate, liberal, or conservative, this measure 
should take on a low value. An increase in the value should have a negative impact on a state’s 
probability of adopting a policy. The most recent adopter is given more weight than earlier adopters, 
acknowledging both the importance of recency in a media cycle and the information gained from all 
previous adopters. 
Finally, with the limited resources available to understand how new policies might, or might 
not, work in a state, legislators are often required to take shortcuts to aid their understanding and 
decision-making. Some of these shortcuts involve relying on their political parties or core ideological 
beliefs, but others are provided by outside agencies. One structure employed to examine these 





framework (ACF) groups policy actors into one or more advocacy coalitions based on their beliefs 
and coordination strategies (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2017). Other researchers have used Kingdon’s 
(1984) term, policy entrepreneur, to identify this role (Mintrom, 1997; Mintrom & Norman, 2009; 
Mintrom & Vergari, 1996, 1998). Entrepreneurs, operating across state lines, influence policy 
agendas by providing knowledge and understanding of innovations elsewhere, offering experts from 
other states or areas where innovations have occurred, and learning which strategies have met with 
success in other states (Mintrom, 1997). Interest groups can play this role, and influence diffusion, 
through various strategies and tactics, including political lobbying and the provision of “expert 
knowledge” (Beyers et al., 2008; Gray, 1973; Hall & Deardorff, 2006). For example, in a study of 
term-limit interest groups in the 1990s, Boushey (2010) found that the “diffusion of innovations is 
driven not simply by sequential emulation across state governments, but rather by carefully 
orchestrated pressure campaigns of organized interests that strategically work to see policies adopted 
in as many states as is feasible” (p. 4).   
However, while these entrepreneurs and interest groups can seek to enact change, they can 
also act as obstacles to innovation. Interest group or professional organization pressures will be 
amplified or muted by the existence and the power of the group in a state. States, where an interest 
group is well-organized or powerful, will be more likely to be influenced by the group and adopt 
their policy positions, whether it is to innovate or to retain the status quo. Unions are one such 
group, some states have large union representation while others do not. Unions have been found to 
impact change in policy diffusion and innovations (Balla, 2001; Dixit & Londregan, 1996; Meyer et 
al., 2005; Strunk et al., 2018). Historically advocating for better working conditions and increased 
compensation and benefits, unions can create a powerful voice in advocating for changes or 
improvements in state support and for negotiating, or fighting for, generous pay and benefit 





fundamental aspect of compensation packages sought by organized labor. Kapinos (2009) states, 
“unions tend to optimize for the less mobile and more senior workers, who clearly would not prefer 
conversions” (p. 156). In studying pension plan conversions in private firms, the author found that 
plans covering unionized employees were between 30 and 40 percent less likely to convert. These 
groups also often provide comprehensive information and pre-determined or pre-drafted policies to 
legislators for implementation. “At both the state and national level, teachers’ unions are one of, if 
not the, most important sources of interest group opposition to education reform in general” (Jones, 
2010, p. 100). Meyer et al. (2005) noted that although unions are limited in their ability to affect 
education policy at the national level, they can have a profound effect on state-level legislation.  
One measure of union strength which has been used to identify their influence is a union’s 
size. Strunk et al. (2018) examined the collective bargaining agreements (CBA) between teachers’ 
unions and district leadership governing teacher working conditions in California, Michigan, and 
Washington. The authors found that district size, a variable correlated with larger and stronger 
unionization, induces greater variation in CBA provision content than affluence. Budd (2017), in 
examining benefit differences of unionized versus non-unionized firms, noted that “workplaces with 
at least 50 percent union members have total expenditures on nonmandatory benefit items 25 to 35 
percent higher than similar nonunion workplaces” (p. 165). The higher the percentage of union 
membership, the greater the impacts. Additionally, Ebbinghaus (2011) identified the effect of “veto-
power” of large unions and their associated voting block; these facets provide salient forces of 
influence on legislators and their agendas. Analyzing pension reform across the 17 nations that were 
members of both the EU and the OECD between 1995 and 2008, Ondrej Schneider (2009) found 
that only, “the measure of trade union power proves to be significant in explaining pension reforms” 
(p. 1). Politicians in states with a greater percentage of union membership are more apt to target 





To examine the effect of external mechanisms in my unified models, I will use the following 
variables: Percent of Border States with Private Plans, Length of Time Border States Have Been Private, Citizen 
Ideology Distance, State Ideology Distance, Percent of State Unionized, Percent of Public Employees Unionized. 
Hypotheses for the effect of the external mechanisms on the introduction and outcomes of pension 
legislation are presented below. 
Hypothesis 16: States with a higher Percent of Border States and Border State Private Time will: RQ 1 – 
have a higher probability of introducing pension change legislation; RQ 2 – have lower odds of proposing a study; RQ 
3 – have a higher probability that pension change will reach or pass a chamber floor; RQ 4 – have a higher 
probability that pension change will be adopted. Legislation aimed at reforming pension systems takes time, 
and outcomes may not be known for several years. Therefore, the longer the time a legislator or 
state has to observe the results of other’s reforms, the more likely they are to learn the possible 
outcomes and to design options that could circumvent identified problems. 
Hypothesis 17: States with higher Citizen or State Ideology Distances will: RQ 1 – have a lower probability 
of introducing pension change bills; RQ 2 – have higher odds of proposing a study; RQ 3 – have a lower probability 
that pension change will reach or pass a chamber floor; RQ 4 – have a lower probability of adopting change. 
Hypothesis 18: States with a higher percentage of State or Public Employee Unionization will have a lower 
probability that pension structural reform will be adopted. 
Final Model Specification 
I employ a logit link to arrive at the final specification form of the model. Following the 
nomenclature of Singer and Willett (2003), the model is expressed as: 
𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ℎ�𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� = �𝛼𝛼1𝐷𝐷1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛼𝛼2𝐷𝐷2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ⋯+  𝛼𝛼18𝐷𝐷18𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� 
                                                + �𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ⋯+  𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�            (Eq. 8) 
where: 





i = 1, … 49 for the 49 states in the riskset 
j = 1, …. 18 for time period 
β1 – k = The vector of the following predictor covariates (X1-kij ): 
     Percent of Senate - Republican = % Rep Senate 
     Percent of House - Republican = % Rep House 
     Percent of Total Legislature - Republican = % Rep Total 
     Governor Party = Governor 
     Unified Government = Unified Govt 
     Citizen Ideology = Citizen Liberal (the higher the score, the more liberal) 
     Lagged Citizen Ideology = Lag Citizen Liberal 
     Citizen Ideology Distance = Citizen Id Dist 
     State Ideology Distance = State Id Dist 
     Percent of Border States with Private Plans = % Border Private 
     Length of Time Border States Have Been Private = Time Border Private 
     Teacher Only Plan = Teacher Only 
     Social Security = Social Security 
     Active/Beneficiary Ratio = Active/Beneficiary 
     State Contribution Rate = State Cont Rate 
     Funded Ratio of Pension Plan = Fund Ratio 
     Percentage Change of Funded Ratio = % Ratio Chng 
     General Fund Percent Spent on Education = % GF on Ed 
     Total Budget Percent Spent on Education = % Total on Ed 
     State Revenue Per Capita = PC Rev 





     Gross State Product Per Capita = PC GSP 
     Percentage of Population 65 or older = % Pop>65 
     Percent of Labor Force Unionized = % St Union  
     Percent of Public Employees Unionized = % PE Union 
     Lagged U.S. Stock Market = Lag Market 
     State Unemployment Rate = Unemployed 
 Definitions and sources of all covariates are presented in Appendix B. Summary statistics are 










CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
Overview of the Approach 
This study examined the factors that impact teacher pension structural change legislation. 
The four research questions focused on the stages of policy legislation, from initial proposal to 
change, through whether legislation mandated an actual change or a study, the progress of change 
legislation within a chamber, through the enactment of state teacher pension privatization. The study 
examined these legislative progressions across 49 states, not including Washington which had 
previously enacted change and maintained a DB structure, from 2000 through 2017. The dependent 
variables for the study were: Question 1: Legislation Proposed, Question 2: Pension Change or 
Study (if Legislation Proposed), Question 3: Last Action Taken for Change Proposal, and Question 
4: The Hazard Rate for Pension Enactment.  
During the observation period, only four states, Arkansas, Delaware, Mississippi, and South 
Dakota, did not propose any pension change legislation; all others proposed a structural change or 
study at least once. Pennsylvania proposed change 12 times before enacting legislation in 2017 and 
New Hampshire retained a DB structure although legislation was proposed 11 times. Through this 
period, the 44 states that proposed some form of change legislation could have experienced single or 
repeated proposal events with various levels of “success” for the proposed reform. During this 
period, 12 states enacted legislation to privatize state teacher pensions at some level, and one state 
entered the dataset, West Virginia, as a result of reconverting to a DB plan. I begin the discussion of 
the results with an examination of the factors that influence the introduction of legislation, what 
type of legislation is introduced, and to what extent is pension change legislation supported in either 





state, I present the survival, or hazard, function analysis of those states where reform legislation was 
adopted with the states subsequently exiting the risk set. 
I employ the following model specifications to examine my research questions: Questions 1 
and 2 – binary logit model examining (Q1) whether legislation is proposed in a state (1) or not (0) in 
any year prior to the enactment of change and (Q2) for policy proposals, whether legislation directs 
a study (1) or a change (0); Question 3 – ordered logit model examining whether proposed change 
legislation dies in committee (1), dies on a chamber floor (2), or passes a chamber(3); and Question 
4 – discrete time hazard event history model for whether a state adopts pension structural change. 
Specifications and outcomes are detailed in Table 4. Stata 14 was used for all calculations.   
Table 4.  
Model Specification and Outcome Variable Definitions 
Research Question Model (Discrete Time EHA) Dependent Variable (Outcome) 
1. Bill Introduction Logit 0 – No legislation introduced 1 – Legislation introduced 
2. Change or Study Proposed Logit 0 – Change Proposal 1 – Study Proposal 
3. Last Action Taken Ordered Logit 
1 – Died in a committee 
2 – Died on the chamber floor 
3 – Passed the chamber floor 
4. Privatization Adoption Logit 0 – No Structural Change 1 – Structural Change Signed 
All results include four models, displaying individual determinant areas. I refer to the various 
initial political, economic, and economic/plan models as restricted models, naming the combined 
model, including all relevant variables and interactions, the final model. My initial analyses included 
all factor variables identified through the theoretical reviews. To check for multicollinearity, I ran 
correlation tests to limit including highly correlated indicators. However, some correlated variables 
are maintained and are discussed following the presentation of the correlation matrices. Tables 5 and 






























   






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Examination of the political variables indicates that the percentage of Republicans in the 
House and Senate are highly correlated, which is expected and led me to use the total percentage of 
Republican legislators to analyze partisan impacts on introduction, a study versus a change, and 
enactment. However, I included both House and Senate in the analysis of final action taken to 
identify differences between chambers. Since state and public employee union membership are 
highly correlated, I chose to use just state membership in my models; robustness tests with public 
employee membership produced similar results. As expected, union membership and Republican 
percentages are inversely correlated, with a strong correlation between the House percent and public 
employee unions. Correlations of economic variables indicate that the funded ratio is highly 
inversely correlated with both state and employee contribution rates – this is expected as the more a 
state contributes, the higher the burden becomes to keep the pension plan fully funded and this can 
lead to either increased underfunding or, due to knowledge asymmetries, to an opportunity to shift 
funding to more visible areas resulting in decreasing funding ratios which can be amortized to later 
generations (Backes et al., 2016; Splinter, 2017; Thom & Randazzo, 2015). This is similar for social 
security and contributions, which is expected as contributions that would be made into the federal 
plan are needed to provide a more generous state option. Finally, lagged per capita GSP and 
revenues are highly correlated, which is expected as revenues reflect the result of the overall 
economic climate, measured by GSP.  
For the final analyses, I constructed individual models and ran multicollinearity tests of 
individual and collective significance to reduce the final specifications to those factors found to be 
significant. I clustered standard errors at the state level to address issues of heteroskedasticity. While 
the time period is included in all analyses, I do not include the results in the presentation of findings; 





In the final results, I provide the model coefficients accompanied by the exponentiated 
statistics, expressed in the form of hazard ratios, with levels of statistical significance. Hazard ratios 
greater than one signify an increased risk of failure, or a pension change proposal or enactment, with 
an increase in the predictor variables. In contrast, ratios less than one indicate a negative relationship 
between the risk of a proposal or enactment with increasing independent variables. Additionally, I 
include the marginal effects with statistical significance, indicating the effect of change at the means 
of independent variables on the change in the predicted probability of risk of proposal or enactment. 
I address specification and robustness tests following the presentation of the findings from each 
model. The following sections present my results, in order, for the four research questions. 
Findings 
This section presents the results of my models from each of my four questions. The overall 
findings provide evidence that both internal determinants and external mechanisms have an impact 
on legislation within a state. However, findings fall short of providing causal evidence of any single 
factor or mechanism through which legislators propose pension change legislation or adopt policy.  
Introduction of Pension Change Legislation  
The first models examine whether any legislation to structurally change teacher pension is 
introduced. Results for the four models, three restricted and the final model, are presented in Table 
7. Analysis of model specification tests, demonstrated by the decreasing values of the Log-
Likelihood and increasing values of McFadden’s Pseudo R -Squared as the political, economic, and 
interacted covariates are introduced indicates increased fit; the inclusion of the covariates from all 
three of the restricted models increases the power of the final model. The final model has a Wald 
Chi2 (26) of 154.97 with p<0.001. This suggests that both internal state characteristics and external 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Exploring the political variables in isolation, including the percent of Republicans in the state 
legislature, lagged citizen ideology, and the pressures on legislators from border states, none of the 
covariates have any impact. Concerning isolated economic and plan variables, the percent of a state’s 
General Fund budget spent on K-12 education and the state contribution rate to the pension fund 
are significant. When political and economic factors are jointly considered, the economic variables 
remain significant, with the addition of lagged per capita state revenues, and private plans in border 
states gain significance. In the final model, when the percent of Republicans is interacted with 
citizen ideology, border state plans and lagged per capita revenues lose a level of statistical 
significance; however, the economic indicators remain strong predictors and the interaction is 
statistically significant. 
Examining the level of impact of the covariates in the final model, an increase in the 
percentage of border states with private teacher pension plans has marginal statistical significance. A 
one percent increase in the percentage of border states with private plans is associated with a 4 
percentage point increase in the odds of the probability of legislation being introduced. This finding 
supports my hypothesis that individual legislators, similar to legislative bodies in states, may be 
learning from, imitating, or being forced to compete if neighbors offer an option that is not 
currently available which might influence an exodus of early-career or specialized teachers. 
Economic forces have greater significance, both statistically and practically. However, there is no 
support for the impact of the funded ratio on legislation introductions. The coefficients of the 
model indicate that the percent of the General Fund spent on education has a negative impact on 
legislative proposals while an increase in a state’s contribution rate increases the probability of 
introduction, which supports my hypothesis on effort level and the reduction in calls for change. 
Exponentiating these results into odds ratios provides that a one percent increase in a state’s 





pension change legislation introduction while an increase in a state’s contribution rate is associated 
with a 4.6% increase in the odds of introduction. This supports the hypothesis that those states that 
already contribute a larger percentage of their budget towards education are less likely to want, or 
possibly need, to change, which may be indicated by the contribution rate already required – if that 
is high, options or competing priorities in a budget might require examinations of where savings 
may be realized, leading to attempts to decrease required contribution amounts. The interaction of 
the total percent of Republicans in the state legislature with the level of citizen liberalism has a 
positive impact and is also statistically significant, but has a very small practical impact with a .1 
percent greater change in the odds of a proposal introduction.  
Marginal effects of the final model are presented in Table 8, indicating the changes in the 
predicted probabilities based on changes at the unit means of the individual covariates and for the 
interaction of percent Republicans and citizen ideology, examining the mean impact of one at the 
25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles for the other, then reversing the analysis.  
Table 8 
Marginal Effects for Factors Influencing Legislation Introduction 
  dy/dx Std Err z P>|z| 95 % Conf Interval 
% Rep Total (CI 25) 0.0004 0.0018 0.22 0.82 -0.0031 0.0039 
% Rep Total (CI 50) 0.0019 0.0018 1.06 0.29 -0.0016 0.0054 
% Rep Total (CI 75) 0.0041* 0.0022 1.87 0.06 -0.0002 0.0083 
Lag Cit Liberal (Rep 25) 0.0027 0.0022 1.23 0.22 -0.0016 0.0070 
Lag Cit Liberal (Rep 50) 0.0048** 0.0022 2.16 0.03 0.0004 0.0091 
Lag Cit Liberal (Rep 75) 0.0065*** 0.0024 2.68 0.01 0.0017 0.0113 
% Border Private 0.0068* 0.0036 1.90 0.06 -0.0002 0.0137 
Fund Ratio -0.0029* 0.0017 -1.72 0.09 -0.0062 0.0004 
% Ratio Chng 0.0028 0.0031 0.90 0.37 -0.0033 0.0088 
% GF on Ed -0.0044** 0.0017 -2.57 0.01 -0.0077 -0.0010 
Lag PC Revenue -0.0000* 0.0000 -1.74 0.08 -0.0001 0.0000 
State Cont Rate 0.0077** 0.0031 2.50 0.01 0.0017 0.0137 
* p < 0.1    ** p < 0.05    *** p < 0.01     
Results of the predicted probabilities reflect the findings of the changes in the coefficients 





the percent of border states with private plans, have little statistical impact on introducing pension 
change bills, with only marginal significance at very high levels of lagged citizen liberalism. However, 
an increase in liberalism, increases the predicted probability of legislation in more Republican states, 
by .48 percentage points at the median and by .65 percentage points at the 75th percentile. This 
indicates that states with a higher percentage of Republican legislators may seek to push conservative 
agenda ideas, especially in liberal environments. Economic indicators are much more significant and 
predictive. An increase in the percent a state’s General Fund budget spent on education, from a 
mean of 35 percent, decreases the predicted probability of legislation being introduced by .44 
percentage points while an increase in the level of state contributions to the pension fund increases 
the probability of legislation introduction by .77 percentage points. 
Akaike information criterion and Bayesian information criterion (AIC/BIC) results were 
compared during variable selection and model construction and between the restricted and final 
models in the analysis to ensure independent variables belonged in the model and evaluate overall 
goodness of fit. Similarly, final models were run with and without the inclusion of Nebraska, due to 
its unicameral legislature and non-partisan elections; measures indicated that excluding Nebraska 
from the final analysis provided a better fit. Additionally, a Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness of Fit test 
for model misspecification, using four groups, was run with results indicating a chi2 (2) value of 
4.16, Prob > chi2 = 0.1247, rejecting the null hypothesis that the model was misspecified while a 
classification test indicated that nearly 81 percent of the sample was correctly classified, with a 72 
percent positive predictive value and an 82 percent negative predictive rate.  
Overall, political and geographic variables have only a marginally significant effect on the 
probability of the introduction of pension reform legislation in a state. Economic variables, although 
not all predictive, have varied impacts on pension change legislation introduction; the higher a state’s 





introduced, but this effect was tempered by the percent states contributed to education as a percent 
of their general fund budget. 
Legislation Mandating Change or Study  
The following models examine whether legislation that was introduced provided for the 
structural change of teacher pension plans or mandated the formation of a committee or study to 
examine the feasibility and impacts of enacting change. Results for the four models of change versus 
study, three restricted and the final model, are presented in Table 9. Similar to the introduction of 
legislation, analysis of model specification tests, demonstrated by the decreasing values of the Log-
Likelihood and increasing values of McFadden’s Pseudo R-Squared as the political, economic, and 
interacted covariates are introduced indicates increased fit; the inclusion of the covariates from all 
three of the restricted models increases the power of the final model. The final model has a Wald 
Chi2 (28) of 436.70 with p<0.001. This again suggests that both internal state characteristics and 
external forces influence whether introduced legislation mandates a study or change.   
Exploring the political variables in isolation, both the percentage of Republicans and of 
border states with private plans are statistically significant and both variables decrease the odds of 
legislation seeking a study – proposed legislation is more likely to mandate a change. Concerning 
isolated economic and plan variables, the percent of a state’s total budget spent on K-12 education 
(versus the General Fund budget), lagged per capita revenue, and a state’s pension fund contribution 
rate are significant. The percent of the budget on education and state contributions decrease the 
odds of a study, but per capita revenues increase the odds of legislation calling for an examination. 
However, in the final model, when the percent of Republicans is interacted with lagged citizen 
liberalism, all individual variables are statistically significant at p<0.01 with the interaction marginally 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Examining the level of impact of the covariates in the final model, a one percent increase in 
the percentage of border states with private teacher pension plans is associated with a 15 percentage 
point decrease in the odds of the proposed legislation mandating a study – proposed legislation has 
15 percent better odds of calling for change, statistically significant at p<0.01. This finding further 
supports my “legislator possibly learning from or competing with those nearby” hypothesis; they 
may use their neighbor’s pre-existing private plan as the “study” on which to base a call for change.  
In terms of the economic covariates, the coefficients of the model indicate that both an 
increase in the percent of the total budget spent on education and a state’s contribution rate have a 
strong negative impact while an increase in lagged per capita revenues increases the probability of 
legislation for a study. Exponentiating these results into odds ratios provides that a one percent 
increase in a state’s total budget spent on education is associated with a decrease of 22 percent in the 
odds of introduced legislation mandating a study and an increase in a state’s contribution rate is 
associated with a 14 percent decrease in the odds of introduction. This conflicts with results from 
pension change introduction, where a higher percentage on education indicated less likelihood of 
introducing any legislation – in this case, any legislation proposed is more likely to call for immediate 
change rather than a study. The results of the funding ratio effect indicate that as states increase their 
funding levels, the odds of proposed legislation mandating a study, versus call for a change, increase 
by 3.7 percent, but these results are only significant at p<0.1. The direction of the impact supports 
my hypothesis that a better-funded pension offers an opportunity to study options versus requiring 
immediate change, but support is weak as seen by the lack of significance. The interaction of the 
total percent of Republicans in the state legislature with lagged citizen liberalism has a positive 
impact and is also statistically significant, but this is small practically, with a .2 percent increased 





Marginal effects of the final model are presented in Table 10, indicating the changes in the 
predicted probabilities based on changes at the unit means of the individual covariates and for the 
interaction of percent of Republicans and citizen ideology, examining the mean impact of one at the 
25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles for the other, then reversing the analysis.  
Table 10  
Marginal Effects of Variables Influencing Proposal for Study or Structural Change 
  dy/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| 95% Conf Interval 
% Rep Total (CI 25) -0.0155*** 0.0029 -5.44 0.00 -0.0211 -0.0099 
% Rep Total (CI 50) -0.0133*** 0.0022 -5.99 0.00 -0.0177 -0.0089 
% Rep Total (CI 75) -0.0102*** 0.0016 -6.30 0.00 -0.0134 -0.0070 
Lag Cit Liberal (Rep 25) -0.0097*** 0.0034 -2.83 0.01 -0.0165 -0.0030 
Lag Cit Liberal (Rep 50) -0.0062** 0.0029 -2.10 0.04 -0.0119 -0.0004 
Lag Cit Liberal (Rep 75) -0.0033 0.0023 -1.44 0.15 -0.0077 0.0012 
% Border Private -0.0284*** 0.0100 -2.84 0.004 -0.0480 -0.0088 
Fund Ratio 0.0071* 0.0040 1.77 0.077 -0.0008 0.0151 
% GF on Ed 0.0057 0.0067 0.86 0.392 -0.0074 0.0189 
% Total on Ed -0.0418*** 0.0064 -6.51 0.000 -0.0544 -0.0292 
Lag PC Revenue 0.0002** 0.0001 2.5 0.012 0.0000 0.0003 
Teacher Only 0.0103 0.0805 0.13 0.898 -0.1475 0.1682 
State Cont Rate -0.0260** 0.0121 -2.14 0.032 -0.0498 -0.0022 
* p < 0.1    ** p < 0.05    *** p < 0.01 
Results of the predicted probabilities reflect the directions of the changes in the coefficients 
and the odds ratios. Unlike for the proposal of legislation, political variables demonstrate high 
statistical significance (p<0.01), with the exception of the mean of lagged citizen ideology at the 
median and 75th percentile of percent Republican representation, where significance decreases. An 
increase of percent Republicans in the legislature decreases the predicted probability of legislation 
for a study; this effect is much higher at lower (more conservative) citizen ideology levels (decrease 
of 1.5 percentage points) than at higher (more liberal) scores (a 1.0 percentage point decrease). This 
supports my hypothesis that a conservative populace (lower ideology score) is more likely to desire 
change, and elected officials may signal their desire to appeal to the constituency by introducing bills 





smaller percentages of Republicans in moderate states are more likely to desire change rather than a 
study while higher percentages have no statistical effect for either. Also, an increase in the percent of 
border states with established private pension plans decreases the predicted probability of proposing 
a study by 2.7 percentage points supporting the idea of learning from a neighbor or being forced to 
compete for resources in the teacher labor market. 
Once legislation is proposed, economic indicators are less predictive of what type of bill is 
put forth. An increase in the state’s funding ratio has only a marginally significant and practical 
effect, increasing the probability legislation will call for a study by .6 percent with p<0.1. The 
direction supports my hypothesis, but the significance does not. Additionally, reflecting the change 
in the odds ratios and the findings from above, an increase in the percent of a state’s total budget is 
spent on education, from a mean of 21 percent, decreases the predicted probability of legislation 
calling for a study by 4.2 percent and an increase in the level of state contributions to the pension 
fund also decreases a study by 2.58 points. However, an increase in lagged per capita revenues 
increase the predicted probability of a study by .02 percent, p<0.05. This again appears small, but 
with per capita revenues in the thousands, the effect adds quickly. 
Again, AIC/BIC results were compared during variable selection and model construction 
and between the restricted and final models in the analysis to ensure independent variables belonged 
in the model and evaluate the overall goodness of fit. Similarly, final models were run with and 
without the inclusion of Nebraska; measures indicated that excluding Nebraska from the final 
analysis provided a better fit. A Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness of Fit test of model misspecification, 
using five groups, was run with results indicating a Chi2 (2) value of 1.28, Prob >.chi2 = 0.7327, 
rejecting the null hypothesis that the model was misspecified while a classification test indicated that 
over 84 percent of the sample was correctly classified, with a 75 percent positive predictive value 





Overall, political and geographic variables are strong predictors of the type of legislation 
introduced, whether for a change or a study. Legislation proposed in more conservative states with a 
greater percentage of Republican legislators and those with a higher percentage of neighbors with 
private teacher pension plans is less likely to all for a study. Economic variables appear less 
predictive on which type of legislation is introduced; with higher percentages spent on education and 
contributed towards current plans leading towards changes rather than studies. This effect was 
tempered by possible increased resources available, indicated by higher per capita revenues, which 
drove legislation for studies. 
Maximum Level of Final Action Taken for Pension Change  
The following models examine how far legislation which was introduced to change pension 
plans progressed through a chamber in the legislature. Results for the four models, three restricted 
and the final model, are presented in Table 11, with significant marginal effects producing predicted 
probabilities presented in Table 12. Analysis of model specification tests, through Log-Likelihood 
and McFadden’s Pseudo R -Squared indicate that inclusion of economic variables only decreases the 
power of the model, unlike in the previous analyses including pension plan attributes with economic 
variables increases the specification towards the level of political variables only. However, almost 
none of the individual covariates in the restricted models reach statistical significance. When all 
categories are included, model fit noticeably improves. This suggests that different factors may 
influence the determination of the progress of legislation once introduced, depending on the 
environment. The final model has a Wald chi2 (15) = 109.09, p<0.001, supporting valid model 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Analyzing the results shows that the partisan composition of either chamber is not a 
significant factor in how far legislation progresses. Similarly, budget percentages spent on education, 
per capita revenues, GSP, or fiscal shock, and the percent of the population over 65 years old has no 
statistical effect. However, the percent of a state’s labor force that is unionized and Plan Attributes 
do have a statistically significant effect, most notably in predictions in whether a proposal dies in 
committee (1) or passes a chamber (3). Contrary to my hypothesis positing that a stronger union 
presence in a state would increase the probability of legislation dying in committee and decrease 
passing a chamber, results indicate that a one percent increase in state union membership is 
correlated with a 5.7 percentage point decrease of proposed legislation dying in committee and a 4.9 
point increase in passing a chamber; these results are significant at p<0.01. Funding ratios have only 
a small and marginal effect on legislation progress. In line with my hypothesis stating a healthier 
pension funding ratio decreases the probability of legislation progress, a one percent increase in the 
ratio is associated with a .42 percentage point increase in legislation dying in committee and a .37 
percentage point decrease in legislation passing a chamber; however, these are significant at p<0.1.  
The influence of plans only including teachers (or school employees, i.e., Michigan) supports 
my hypothesis regarding the public perception and framing of teachers. A change towards a teacher-
only plan is associated with an increase in the predicted probability that introduced legislation will 
die in committee by 22 percentage points and a decrease of 18 percentage points that it will pass a 
chamber, both significant at p<0.01. Additionally, a change towards teacher inclusion in Social 
Security is associated with a decrease in the predicted probability that introduced legislation will die 
in committee by 48 percentage points and an increase of 42 percentage points that it will pass a 
chamber, both significant at p<0.01. This result is counter to my hypotheses regarding options 
beyond just the state plan and inclusion in the federal program. I surmised this exclusion would 





and widespread support for long-term charity towards teachers; this points to the requirement to 
better understand what other forces are impacting pension legislation inside states. Finally, the 
effects of state contribution rates are modest, with a one-unit increase associated with a decrease in 
the predicted probability of remaining in committee by 1.4 percentage points and an increase of 1.2 
percentage points of passage by a chamber, significant at p<0.05.  
AIC/BIC results were compared during variable selection and model construction and 
between the restricted and final models to ensure independent variables belonged and to evaluate 
the overall goodness of fit. Final models were run with and without Nebraska, and with and without 
the Year variables. Although elimination of the Year decreased some goodness of fit measures, 
results indicated improved efficiency and consistency in standard errs. Test results also indicated that 
excluding Nebraska from the final analysis provided a better fit. Additionally, predicted probabilities 
of outcomes using the final model were run with the results presented below. 
  Table 13  
  Predicted Probabilities of Pension Change Legislation Final Model 
Final Model Predicted Probabilities 
 Mean Std Dev 
1 - Die in Committee 0.8359 0.2543 
2 - Die in Chamber 0.0362 0.0446 
3 - Pass Chamber 0.1279 0.2216 
Based on 127 legislative proposals to privatize state teacher pension plans introduced 
between 2000 and 2017, this translates to a mean of 106 bills dying in committee, 5 bills dying on a 
chamber floor, and 16 passing compared to an actual outcome of 105, 5, and 17. These results also 
demonstrate the limited number of bills that make it out of committee, and the infinitesimal number 
that pass from a committee only to die on a chamber floor. 
Regarding overall findings for the covariates that influence the outcome of teacher pension 





or significant predictive effect on the ultimate outcome. Pension plan attributes appear to have the 
most significant effect and models that include multiple types of variables (economic, political, 
interest group, etc.,) are more predictive.  
Pension Change Legislation Signed into Law  
The final models examine the enactment of teacher pension structural change legislation. 
Before the presentation of the results of the analysis, Figures 2 and 3 present two representations of 
the Survival Function for pension change legislation adoption, the smoothed function from the life 
tables analysis and the Kaplan-Meier step function. The analysis time (x-axis) is in years representing 
the time since the start of the study. The smoothed function starts with the “failure” of the first state 
in the riskset (Ohio) while the Kaplan Meier begins at the beginning of the study period. The 
survival probability (y-axis – the proportion of states remaining in the riskset who have not enacted 
change) ranges from .72 to 1 for this study. Figure 4 presents the Nelson-Aalen Cumulative Hazard 
Estimate. Similar to the survival function graphs, the analysis time (x-axis) is in years representing 
the time since the start of the study, but the y-axis indicates the percentage of states that have exited 
the riskset and ranges from 0 to .28.  
Figure 2 Figure 3 
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Cumulative Hazard Estimate of Pension Enactment 
 
The graphic representations of the survival and hazard functions display early evidence of a 
typical diffusion function, where initial adoption of a new policy is slow, followed by an increase in 
the enactment of change, although there is no evidence that further adoptions of pension change 
will continue this trajectory. Additionally, the more rapid change in state adoptions (steeper decline 
in the Survivor Functions or rise in the Hazard Estimate) correspond with the Years 2010-2013, just 
after the Great Recession where state budgets and pension assumed returns declined, and the 
emergence of the Tea Party faction in the Republican party, and legislatures may have been more 
inclined to initiate changes to prevent larger increases in unfunded liabilities and future liabilities. 
Results for the four models of pension privatization legislation enactment, three restricted 
and the final model, are presented in Table 14. During the construction of the final model, two rare 
event models were examined, a Firth Logit and an Exact Logit as suggested by Richard Williams 
(2019). Exact logit, which controls for biases in rare events, only works with small samples (typically 
N<200 due to computing power and limitations) and does not allow for clustering of errors. Firth 
Logit, a method found to be less biased and more up to date than Tomz, King, and Zeng’s (1999) 
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penalized likelihood instead of Maximum Likelihood Estimation to correct for small-sample bias 
does not allow categorical variables nor clustering of errors. Both approaches decreased the fit and 
power of the models. I conducted specification tests following the construction of the final model, 
utilizing a similar approach to model specification for questions 1 and 2. Analysis showed decreasing 
values of the Log Likelihood and increasing values of McFadden’s Pseudo R -Squared as political, 
economic, and pension plan covariates were introduced, but interactions between partisanship and 
government makeup proved to be insignificant, reducing model fit and increasing multicollinearity. 
The final model has a Wald chi2 (19) = 1538.08, p<0.001. This suggests that both internal state 
characteristics and external forces are important in explaining the introduction of state pension 
legislation. For the final models, the Year variable was dropped. Due to the small number of failure 
(policy changes) over the 17 years of the study and the numerous years where no change occurred, 
including the Year variable resulted in the loss of over 440 observations and model consistency. 
Examining the level of impact of the covariates in the final model, in the area of political 
influences, states with Republican Governors were associated with an increase of 24 times the odds 
of enacting pension reform than states with Democratic Governors and a one-unit change in the 
percentage of total Republicans in the legislature is associated with an increase of 19 percentage 
points, both results significant at p<0.01. These findings support my hypothesis on the impact of 
Republican representation on the probability of policy change focused on fiscal conservatism and 
privatization. However, a unified government shows no statistical significance in the enactment of 
pension reform. Additionally, unionization percent, either public or statewide, had no significant 
effect which may indicate that partisanship, through the Republican party, or possibly the platform, 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Concerning economic indicators, very few variables were statistically significant. Pension plan 
funding ratio analysis indicates that a one-unit increase in a state’s ratio is associated with a 4.75 
percentage point decrease in the odds a state will enact structural teacher pension reform, significant 
at p<0.05. This supports my hypothesis that the better-funded a plan is, the less impetus there is to 
make changes or reform; this is consistent with legislation introduction and whether proposals are 
directed towards studies or actual change. Additionally, per capita state GSP change, the differential 
from the previous year, and the state’s unemployment level are significant. For GSP change, a one 
percent increase over the previous year is associated with a 34 percent increase in the odds of private 
pension reform enactment, and a one percent increase in unemployment is associated with an 89 
percent increase in the odds of reform. These results support my hypotheses that states with slack 
current resources, identified by increasing GSP, but with an outlook for a decline in future revenues, 
identified by increased unemployment, are more likely to enact changes. Earlier models tested the 
impact of state revenues and state spending on education and found no significant effect. These 
findings did not support my economic hypotheses on enactment although these measures were found 
to be important for the introduction of legislation.  
Diffusion mechanisms appear to affect the adoption of state teacher pension privatization. 
Geographic proximity has a positive effect on the hazard of a state enacting reform, with an increase 
in the percentage associated with a 51 percent increase in the odds that a state will enact change and 
an increase of one year in the time border state teachers have been covered by private pensions 
associated with a 171 percent increase in the probability of enactment. Both of these results support 
my hypotheses and suggest that states are influenced by their neighbors. However, neither state nor 
citizen ideological distance had any significant effect which seems to indicate that neighborhood 





Finally, two attributes of pension plans were statistically significant. If plans covered teachers 
only, the probability of change was almost zero – there was a decrease of over 99 percent in the odds 
compared to a plan that covered additional state employees, significant at p<0.05. This supports a 
framing hypothesis that teachers may be considered dependent and needing of public support and 
that the government remains responsible for those who enter the profession, especially if it provides a 
lower pay scale. However, contrary to my hypothesis that a larger beneficiary percentage would result 
in more calls for the status quo, an increase in the actives to beneficiaries ratio, meaning more current 
as opposed to former members, was associated with a 98 percentage point decrease in the odds of a 
structural change, significant at p<0.01. Social Security and the percentage of the population over 65 
did not have any significant effect. 
AIC/BIC results were used to ensure model specification and evaluate the overall goodness of 
fit. Similarly, final models were run with and without Nebraska; measures indicated that excluding 









CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
Two fields of study form the basis of this work, the political process of public pension plan 
design and the diffusion of policy innovations. Pensions are part of an overall compensation system, 
designed to attract, retain, and transition workers in and through a labor force (Koedel & Podgursky, 
2016; Lazear, 1986; Podgursky, 2011). Pension structure influences labor market behavior (Brown, 
2013; Costrell & McGee, 2020; Friedberg & Turner, 2010; Mitchell & Fields, 1983; Podgursky & 
Ehlert, 2007; Stock & Wise, 1990). Recently, in light of pressures affecting DB pension structures, 
private organizations and foreign governments have enacted reform. In contrast, most U.S. public 
pensions have resisted change. However, a small number of states have enacted reforms. 
Simultaneously, researchers have examined the policy diffusions across various jurisdictions, 
from nations, to states and municipalities (F. S. Berry & Berry, 1990; Cohen‐Vogel & Ingle, 2007; 
Karch, 2006; McLendon & Cohen-Vogel, 2008; Mooney, 2001; Shipan & Volden, 2008). Some have 
analyzed the mechanisms that have influenced pension diffusion, from establishment through pension 
privatization across the OECD (Brooks, 2005, 2007; Holzmann, 2013; Meseguer, 2004; Orenstein, 
2011, 2013; O. Schneider, 2009). However, little work has been examining factors that influence U.S. 
public pension diffusion, especially in the teacher labor market. This paper addresses this gap, 
examining the diffusion of state teacher pension plan legislation. In this section, I discuss my findings 
in relation to the literature, present implications of my findings for policy and practice, and provide 
limitations of the study to suggest avenues and opportunities for future research. 
Summary of Analysis  
In this study, I examined the determinants and mechanisms that influence the diffusion of 





questions, summarized as follows: 1) What influences affect the introduction of pension change 
legislation; 2) For introduced legislation, what factors affect whether a study or a change is proposed; 
3) If change legislation is proposed, what determinants influence the progress of the bill; and 4) What 
instruments affect a state’s decision to adopt a structural change to teacher pension plans? To 
determine answers to these questions, I constructed a dataset, combining by year political, economic, 
pension plan, and demographic information for each of the 50 states using a myriad of primary and 
secondary data sources. Legislation information was collected from legislative archives of each 
individual state and chamber, the StateNet Capitol Journal, and the National Conference of State 
Legislatures. For the analyses, I employed Berry and Berry’s (1990) unified framework through event 
history, discrete time hazard modeling to explore the four questions. Variables and models were 
separated into political, economic, plan attributes, and external diffusion determinants. 
Main findings across the questions indicated that political forces are stronger later in the 
legislative process while citizen ideology is more closely associated with impacts in the introduction 
stage. Economic forces are significant in legislation introduction, but lose significance on progress 
within a chamber. Additionally, the economic factors that influence introduction differ from those 
associated with enactment. Pension plan attributes and demographics have no significant impact on 
the introduction of legislation nor on whether bills mandate a study or a change; however, these 
forces influence the passage in a chamber floor and enactment. Finally, external factors influence all 
aspects of the legislative process regarding pension change. I discuss the primary findings of each of 
these forces in more detail in relation to the four research questions below. 
Political Factors  
Political factors are only weakly associated with the introduction of pension change legislation. 
Although the interaction of Republican representation and citizen ideology is significant, this is 





percentage of Republicans, more supportive of markets and individual responsibilities, increases the 
chances that legislation will be proposed (M. D. Jones, 2010; Moe & Anzia, 2013). It is more reflective 
of Wong and Shen (2002), who found the relationship between Democrat control and changes in 
charter school legislation insignificant. My finding suggests other factors may motivate individual 
legislators or change their value focus, such as personal circumstances (a legislator whose parent 
suffered a pension loss due to bankruptcy of an organization or another whose parent lost their nest 
egg in a market collapse may not follow a party platform) or the environment (legislators whose 
district abuts a labor market competitor), to propose or oppose a change. Citizen ideology appears to 
influence this relationship, but again the effect is marginal. 
Once legislation is introduced, partisanship and ideology are both highly informative of the 
language of the proposal. Unlike in legislation introductions, these results reflect the premise that 
fiscally conservative platforms, measured by an increase in Republicans or a decrease in citizen 
ideology, increase the odds that bills will be introduced that push for privatization rather than examine 
options. However, regarding the progress of pension change legislation in either chamber, neither 
partisanship nor citizen ideology has any statistical effect. These results may be more indicative of 
other forces that affect legislation inside a chamber, such as committee power or the influence of 
interest groups and coalitions in support or opposition (Cox & McCubbins, 2007; Persson & 
Tabellini, 2002; Sabatier, 1988).  
Although the impact of political forces on pension reform through the legislative process is 
not clearly defined, it does play a significant role in the overall enactment of structural change. Both 
the impact of a sitting Republican governor and an overall majority of Republican legislators are 
associated with increased odds of adoption of teacher pension privatization. However, a unified 
government (single-party control) is not associated with any significant effect, reflecting Tandberg and 





pension change, but both together are not required for passage; other forces contribute to encourage 
bipartisanship in reform. Overall, while the magnitude of political force across the legislative process 
was not always significant, the direction of effects supported earlier findings. 
Economic Climate  
Economic determinants were significant across all legislative levels of teacher pension reform; 
however, significance and specific factors differed. Better funding ratios led to increased probabilities 
of legislation introduction and passage by committee, but it also increased the odds of calling for a 
study. These findings were only marginally significant. The impact of the funding ratio on actual 
enactment was more significant, associated with a decrease in the probability of change. These results 
suggest that legislators may attempt to appear to be addressing a negative fiscal situation by 
introducing reform measures, but these measures are more likely to be in the call for a study. Better 
funding and a study may allow legislators to shift the fiscal value on which they focus. Furthermore, 
this supports the findings of Thom and Randazzo (2015), who note states with higher funding ratios 
are more likely to maintain these levels, even during periods of fiscal stress, when states with worse 
funding levels may be inclined to seek other solutions. Individual legislators are more reactive to 
signals than the legislature as a whole. This finding is reinforced by effort measures, where increased 
education spending is only associated with the introduction and content of pension reform legislation, 
suggesting that individual legislators, who might introduce bills into committee, may be more 
influenced by specific measures than a legislative body. 
Market forces and GSP influenced legislation proposals and enactments differently. Market 
forces were only predictive of calling for whether legislation mandated a change or a study. GSP had 
no significant impact on calling for a change versus a study, but was a significant factor in the 
increased probability of progress and enactment of reform. This follows early findings that increased 





significantly associated with the probability of pension change enactment is the state unemployment 
rate. Increases in the rate greatly increased the probability of reform. This supports an additional 
direction of how resources affect the probability of adoption of economic policy changes. Based on 
the prolonged period of time that depressed economic climates impact revenues and budgets, coupled 
with extended time to enact legislative reform, especially regarding pensions and long-term liabilities, 
unemployment may drive governments to action (Brooks, 2007; Munnell, 2012; Reinhart & Rogoff, 
2009; Weyland, 2005). Similar to political forces, these results identify economic factors that impact 
state pension legislation reform, but how they do so requires further study.   
Plan Attributes and Demographics  
Public perception and support of teachers and the political influence of older voters had little 
impact on the early stages of the legislative process for teacher pension structural reform, but plan 
attributes were predictive of changes in the probability of pension reform enactment. The lack of 
impact on bill introduction, of either change or study, or on bill progress, all where individual 
legislator motivations may be more important than overall public perceptions, is in line with some 
earlier literature and was borne out in model construction. However, based on Schneider et al.’s 
(2014) social construction framework identifying teachers as a dependent population, I surmised that 
if legislation focused on this group was introduced, it would be more apt to call for a study and die in 
committee – two hypotheses which were not supported. Factors beyond the membership of the plan 
affect the initial aspects of teacher pension plan legislative processes. This is not true for reform 
enactment. Plans with only teachers are significantly less likely, both statistically and practically, to 
structurally change. This indicates that the social construction of the teaching profession may not be a 
significant driver of action or inaction within a committee or chamber, but in a larger context, of 
either the legislature as a whole or across the population and media, calls for structural change attract 





beneficiaries mirrored these results; inclusion in any model prior to enactment decreased efficiency. 
Again, even though individuals may fight for or against specific values leading to change proposals, 
once legislation becomes more widely known or has a higher capacity to become enacted, coalitions 
may form to support long-term care of this population and prevent reform adoption. Both these 
findings may support the existence of advocacy coalitions or interest groups that, when threatened, 
mobilize to support or impede passage – here, these organizations are most likely against change.  
This was not the case for states whose teachers are not covered by social security nor for 
higher percentages of older voters. Social security was found not to be significant in the legislative 
process and, contrary to my predictions, was highly predictive of an increase in the hazard of a state 
adopting pension reform. This result may be explained by the small number of changes and after a 
deeper examination of those states that did effect reform. With only 12 states enacting structural 
reform during the period, and only 13 states with teachers not included in social security, a change in 
one state without social security has a major effect on findings. Examination shows that two states 
that enacted reform did not participate in social security; both enacted a hybrid plan, continuing to 
provide a portion of the pension through a defined benefit structure. At this time, making any 
predictions surrounding the effect of social security coverage is inadvisable – this may be different for 
an examination of complete privatization or the adoption of a defined contribution-only plan. 
External Determinants  
Geographic external forces were predictive through several aspects of reform; however, they 
were not predictive in chamber progress. The percentage of border states with private plans increased 
both the likelihood of legislation being introduced and the probability that such legislation would call 
for change. It appears that neighbors with private plans encourage states to look at reforms of their 
own, although the results do not identify which mechanism is responsible. The same increase in 





one border state has had a plan increases the probability that a state will structurally reform its system. 
These results support previous literature that finds geographic proximity affects policy adoption (F. S. 
Berry & Berry, 2017; Hennessy & Steinwand, 2014; Karch, 2006; Meseguer, 2005; Shipan & Volden, 
2008; Weyland, 2005). However, contrary to Mallinson (2021), Grossback et al. (2004), or Brooks 
(2007), my results fail to show any significance related to proximity in ideology in pension innovation. 
It appears, at least regarding teacher pension legislation diffusion, that geographic proximity matters 
more than ideological similarities. 
Finally, the influence of interest groups or coalitions, identified by the percentage of the labor 
force or public employees that are unionized, appears to have no significance on whether legislation is 
enacted; this is true for both overall labor force and public employee unionization. Though previous 
literature has identified a strong association between union strength and legislators adopting union 
positions (Ebbinghaus, 2011; O. Schneider, 2009), these analyses examined other nations in earlier 
times, where and when unions had greater support. Support for unions in the U.S. has declined since 
2000, with several states passing right-to-work laws and the overall average percentage of state and 
public employee labor forces who are members of or are represented by unions declining by 
approximately 20 percent and 15 percent, respectively. These changes may explain unions’ lack of 
explanatory power in this study. 
Significance of Results 
This study, examining factors influencing state teacher pension change, offers preliminary 
insights into forces that drive legislative bodies to propose structural shifts and states to privatize 
plans. The study is the first to explore the entire process across the fifty states, providing a starting 
point from which to better understand when or why states may privatize teacher pensions. This study 
is positioned early in the typical diffusion pattern, which follows an S-shaped trajectory with slow 





have done so (F. S. Berry & Berry, 2017). As legislative pension change is a long process, often 
requiring a major shock to the system and the overcoming of many groups intent on maintaining the 
status quo (Brooks, 2005, 2007; Hennessy & Steinwand, 2014; Holzmann, 2013; Orenstein, 2011), the 
diffusion timeline for innovation may be rather extended. The trends displayed in the survival and 
hazard graphs appear to demonstrate the initial stages of this pattern with infrequent adoptions. 
Economic and societal changes in the later part of the 2000-2010 decade, and the rise of the Tea Party 
in American politics which brought on a focus on a new set of fiscal values, set the stage for increased 
legislation and enactment of change; these forces remain. The motivations that have contributed to an 
increased probability of adoption will continue to manifest, continuing to increase the probability that 
other states may look towards structural changes. Additionally, as the number of states that have 
changed plans increases, more models become available, providing opportunities for learning and 
emulation, or increased competition from neighbors who offer plans considered more desirable by 
younger and more specialized teachers. If geographic proximity is more important than ideological 
similarity, competition for new teachers may be a larger factor driving pension changes. 
 Although partisanship influences adoption, ideology appears to have a greater influence on 
the initial stages of pension legislation. A more conservative populace increases the probability of 
reform legislation being introduced, and of calling for a change. However, I did not find carry over 
into the enactment stage. Although ideology loses significance in the passage of structural changes, 
increased introduction of change legislation provides increased opportunities for eventual change to 
occur – a policy cannot be enacted if it is not introduced – and proposals in committee or on the 
docket can provide rallying points for interest groups or coalitions to spur action in support of one 
value over another. This is important, especially from a framing or social construction perspective, as 
changes in the perception of a group or a policy can shift the narrative and influence public opinion, 





neighbors with private pensions, a shift in the perception of a target population, and an option already 
introduced, during a time of economic distress supports Kingdon’s (1984) windows of opportunity 
framework providing fertile ground for policy change. 
This study also identifies difficulties in building models that analyze policy adoption by 
combining all aspects of the legislative process, from introduction through enactment. In this work, I 
sought to uncover factors that affect the entire chain of state teacher pension reform legislation, but 
more importantly, those that may affect individual stages. The nuances inherent in each of the steps, 
and the governance and functioning of each of the states, require closer examination of the internal 
details and workings. However, results from this study provide a starting point from which to base 
such work.  
Finally, this study provides practical insight for those trying to attract and retain the highest 
quality teaching cadre. Individuals or bodies adopting changes to the deferred component of the 
compensation system will be more knowledgeable concerning forces and motivations that might 
affect change and the obstacles that will be encountered. If 50 percent of new teachers transition out 
or away within five years, 85 percent retire or exit with inadequate pensions to support themselves, 
populations continue to age and beneficiaries increase faster than active members, and the burden to 
keep pensions funded continues to increase for states and governments, changes will be required. In 
an arena of limited resources, these factors will also continue to plague the legislative process as 
various legislators and interested parties fight over the primacy of the various funding model values. 
Structural reform may be allayed if society continues viewing those who educate our children as 
deserving of government support, not just in the classroom, but afterward. While many reforms tinker 
within current structures, this study identifies some of the factors that increase the probability that 
larger changes are made – both teachers and governments need to be prepared. Analysis indicates the 





alternative designs and participation rates may not be sufficient to provide retirement security for 
retiring members. With the extended timeline required to realize the impacts of pension reforms, care 
must be taken when adopting change – options must be carefully considered and balanced with 
competing public demands, but the possibility of change must not be ignored.    
Limitations 
A primary limitation to extrapolating conclusions from this research is the limited number of 
states that have enacted change, with a majority occurring in the past 10 years. Although the entire 
dataset consists of 49 states followed through 18 years, for a total of 793 state-year observations in the 
final riskset, the limited and compressed period of change limits the power of predictions. Although 
event history analysis uses all information efficiently, the small number of policy adoptions increases 
the probability that effects may be found where none exist or that variation may mask actual factors 
that are contributory. This limitation is not uncommon in studying pension diffusion as indicated by 
the number of worldwide structural pension changes, 30 reforms out of 193 possible countries 
through 37 years (Orenstein, 2011). This limitation is amplified constraints in data availability, with the 
detailed data on pensions provided by the Public Pensions Database limited to 2001 and later and 
Citizen Ideology scores limited to 2016 and before. Due to these limitations, Washington’s change in 
1995 and West Virginia’s in 1991 were dropped from the analysis, and changes to state pension plans 
proposed or enacted after 2017 were not included. An increase in adoptions will expand the data 
available and improve the predictions of the model; however, data availability may continue to impact 
analyses. 
The small number of states that have enacted change and the large number of covariates that 
have been identified as determinants or mechanisms that drive diffusion impact the modeling. Current 
rare events models, such as the Firth Logit and Exact Logit, impose constraints on variables and 





events and larger standard errors, although clustered at the state level, or a limitation on categorical 
covariates and clustering for heteroskedastic errors at the state level. I selected the standard logit 
model with larger variance but compared the results and efficiency against both rare events model 
options. Results of the tests supported my model selection.   
Additionally, due to collating data from numerous agencies in numerous formats over several 
decades, there were differences in reporting and methodology of collection. This was noticeable in the 
research of the legislative archives, where different states provided varying amounts of information in 
the access, titles, and summaries of introduced legislation and in the progress of bills into and through 
committees. Comparing results from the legislative archive searches with StateNet Capitol Journal and 
the NCSL repository helped lessen the probability that proposals were left out of the analysis. Also, 
due to the Public Plans Database only reaching back to 2001, information on plan attributes, such as 
numbers of active members and beneficiaries, before those dates comes from calculations derived 
from the Census Bureau and the Public Fund Database. Although in this study, this limitation only 
affects reforms in Ohio, research looking back to the changes in West Virginia and Washington, and 
earlier introductions of legislation, possibly in response to ERISA and the 1978 Tax Reform Act, will 
experience a greater impact. 
Future Research 
This study presents several avenues for future research. The first is the expansion of the time 
frame, to include analysis of the factors that impacted West Virginia and Washington with those that 
influenced later adoption, and also to analyze factors that influenced earlier pension legislation 
proposals. This also identifies an opportunity to examine whether the factors that influenced early 
adopters, or those before 2010 when a noticeable increase in adoptions began, are different than those 
who have adopted change since. Early adopters will not have neighbors or peers providing alternative 





adoptions, the inclusion of later ideological measures, post-2016, will allow the examination of states 
that have adopted reform since 2017. Both of these actions will expand the available numbers of 
adopters and increase the understanding of differences in adoptions. 
Additionally, the political landscape, and the conservative party platform, visibly shifted in 
2010 with the emergence of the Tea Party faction in the Republican Party leading to the possibility of 
alterations in value importance for the more recent reforms. This value change may again be apparent 
following the populist uprising in 2016 and the move towards progressivism in 2020. How these 
changes have affected the ideological platforms of the major parties may have impacts on which value 
individual legislators or states place highest. Understanding these changes in focus will require a 
deeper analysis of individual chambers or states where legislation is proposed. Qualitative studies of 
individual states, specifically around these periods of ideological shift, will enrich the findings of this 
work and help identify some of the motivations behind legislation and how various values, and their 
changes, might impact the individual workings of the political process. 
Further in this vein, another research opportunity is on personal factors that influence teacher 
pension reform legislation introduction. This study offers a high-level overview of forces, but stops 
short of examining how these facets may inspire a legislator to introduce specific reform, or build 
support and a coalition to carry it out of committee. This requires a richer data set, to include the 
legislator who introduces reform, their background, their political party, district ideology and location, 
district teacher labor market and status of schools, political campaign contributions, and information 
from committee meeting minutes to provide a deeper understanding of the motivations of those 
individuals who proposed legislation and those who co-sponsored or supported and formed coalitions 
to encourage progress through a committee or chamber.  
Understanding those limited bills that make it out of committee and die on a chamber floor is 





party, to be overruled. This information may shed light not only on those forces which influence the 
probability of legislation introduction, but also on the inner workings of states that enacted pension 
change and which mechanisms are contributory throughout various stages of the process.  
Finally, this study suggests the need to examine the factors that impede actions towards 
structural change. Identifying what forces act as obstacles, and how these factions coalesce to 
influence the progress and the process can provide a better understanding for those who look to enact 
change, not just in pension reform, but also across other areas of the budget spectrum.    
Conclusion 
 Teacher plans comprise a significant portion of state public pensions in the United States; a 
majority of these provide a defined benefit for a retiree until death. Pension liabilities of the major 
public plans currently stand at 4.83 trillion dollars; this figure continues to grow. Additionally, teacher 
pension plans are only 72 percent funded, down from nearly 100 percent in 2000. Teachers are 
retiring earlier and living longer, increasing the pressure on these systems. Changing a state pension 
system is a product of the legislative process, based on competing demands and values in tension. 
However, some states have enacted change. Using a unified model of policy diffusion as the 
framework to understand how and why the limited number of states have enacted restructuring, I find 
that political forces, economic forces, plan attributes, and external mechanisms are all influential in 
states’ decisions of pension reform adoption, although in different ways through the various stages of 
the legislative process. Understanding those mechanisms that predict change can help policymakers, 
attempting to balance competing constituent demands and value tensions, when faced with having to 
design the deferred portion of teacher compensation systems to better attract and retain the most 





APPENDIX A: LEGISLATION SEARCH STRATEGY 
 The collected dataset of all introduced through enacted legislation was acquired by searching 
through individual state legislative archives, Lexis-Nexis, and the National Conference of State 
Legislatures (NCSL). The following discussion presents my comprehensive search strategies. 
Lexis-Nexis StateNet Capitol Journal database was accessed using Nexis Uni through the 
UNC-Chapel Hill Library. Search filters included the following – Current Collection: Statutes and 
Legislation; Cases and Codes: All States & Territories; Practice Areas & Topics: Pensions & Benefits 
Law and Education Law; Date Range: January 1, 2000 through December 31, 2017 – for the search 
term: Defined Contribution Plans. Titles of the returned legislation and highlighted identification of 
the search terms were examined to identify bills that sought to enact change to teacher pension plans. 
Bills identified as proposing to change or study teacher pension plans were retrieved and read to 
determine the intent and direction of the legislation (mandatory or optional, primary or an additional 
plan, affected teachers). History and tracking were studied for bills that met mandated, primary, 
pension reform for state pension plans containing K-12 public school teachers.  
The NCSL database was accessed through https://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-
policy/pension-legislation-database.aspx. Search filters included the following – TOPICS: Defined 
Contribution and Hybrid Plans, Pension and Retirement Studies, Pensions-Public Employees, and 
Pensions-Teachers; STATES: All States; STATUS: All; Year: 2012-2017 (earliest information 
available). Analysis of the returned results followed the same procedure as the StateNet Capitol 
Journal search. 
To identify state legislative archives, I conducted a by-state Google search; the website 
addresses for each state are contained in Table A1. Depending on the construct and search 
capabilities within each state’s legislative records, various categories and search terms were included. 





Benefits, Public Employees Retirement, Retirement Plan, Retirement System, School Employees 
Retirement, Studies, Teacher, and Teacher Retirement. Within these categories, search terms included 
Defined Contribution and Hybrid. Depending on the state records, some archives provided access to 
both chambers simultaneously, while others required independent searches of each individual 
chamber. Of the 50 states, Kansas did not provide searchable electronic access to the legislative 
records and Hawaii’s electronic searchable database went back to 2004. To retrieve data from these 
states, I contacted the research archivists directly. Both of these individuals conducted a document 
search on my behalf, using the preidentified search parameters and terms, and provided me with a 
synopsis of all introduced legislation that met the constraints which I analyzed to identify which bills 
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